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Melbourne Melbourne 
 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report on the 
audit Asset Confiscation Scheme.  
The audit found that the Asset Confiscation Scheme is not operating as effectively or 
efficiently as it should. Its ability to deprive people of the proceeds of crime, and to 
deter and disrupt further criminal activity, is hampered largely by weaknesses in 
Victoria Police's approach to identifying assets, and weaknesses in how the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme operates as a whole. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
4 September 2013  
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Audit summary 
Asset confiscation is a tool that Victoria's law enforcement and public prosecution 
agencies use in response to criminal activity. The Confiscation Act 1997 (the Act) and 
associated regulations enable the state to confiscate property in order to deprive 
people of the proceeds of certain offences, to disrupt further criminal activity by 
preventing the use of that property, and to deter others from engaging in criminal 
activity. The Act also enables the state to preserve assets for victims' compensation 
and restitution. 
Asset confiscation only applies to certain offences. These include indictable offences, 
as well as more serious, profit-motivated offences that contravene various Acts 
including the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981, Crimes Act 1958, 
and the Sex Work Act 1994.  
Assets that the state seeks to confiscate through a forfeiture order not only need to 
relate to specific offences and thresholds, but also need to be tainted or reasonably 
suspected to be tainted. Tainted assets are those that have been derived wholly or 
substantially from the proceeds of crime, or have been used, or are intended to be 
used, in connection with a crime.  
The Asset Confiscation Scheme 
The Asset Confiscation Scheme (the Scheme) was established in 1998, following the 
commencement of the Act. There are three key agencies that work together to achieve 
the objectives of the Scheme:  
• Victoria Police—primarily through the Criminal Proceeds Squad (CPS) 
• the Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP)—through the Proceeds of Crime 
directorate (POC)  
• the Department of Justice (DOJ)—through the Asset Confiscation Operations 
unit (ACO). 
In addition, the Scheme includes two committees: the Asset Confiscation Scheme 
Executive Management Group (ACSEMG), which oversees the Scheme, and the 
Confiscation Operations Committee, which is concerned with the operational, practical 
and administrative aspects of the Scheme. 
Conclusions 
The Scheme is not operating as effectively or efficiently as it should. Its ability to 
deprive people of the proceeds of crime, and to deter and disrupt further criminal 
activity, is hampered by weaknesses in the way that assets are identified for 
confiscation, and by how the Scheme is governed. 
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Victoria Police plays a critical role in the Scheme as it is responsible for identifying 
assets for confiscation through its investigative processes. However, it is not 
maximising opportunities to identify such assets related to profit-motivated, serious and 
organised crime. 
Its asset confiscation functions are undermined by a failure to make the most of its 
investigative tools, by a lack of effective planning, and by capacity and capability 
weaknesses. Its current focus on victims of crime work does not directly or 
demonstrably contribute to the Scheme’s objectives and diverts it from focusing on 
profit-motivated crime. 
The other Scheme agencies—OPP, and ACO within DOJ—rely on, and react to, the 
work that Victoria Police generates. While opportunities exist to enhance their 
operations—such as planning and performance management for OPP, and procedures 
and performance management for ACO—both agencies are generally performing their 
core asset confiscation functions effectively and efficiently.  
Significant governance weaknesses within the Scheme limit the ability of the agencies 
to work together effectively to implement the government's policy objectives. For 
example, there are unclear objectives, a lack of planning or effective oversight, a lack 
of clear accountability and leadership, a failure to address known longstanding 
weaknesses and the inability to assess performance against objectives. 
Findings 
Scheme performance 
How well the Scheme is performing is unknown as it lacks an effective performance 
framework. Exacerbating this is the absence of effective performance frameworks 
within the individual agencies.  
The need for a performance framework to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the Scheme was first identified in VAGO’s 2003 Report on Public Sector Agencies. The 
recommendation to develop overarching performance measures was accepted by 
DOJ. Despite its commitment ten years ago to develop such measures for the 
Scheme, this has not yet occurred.  
Asset Confiscation Scheme reviews and evaluations 
The Scheme has been subjected to three commissioned reviews between 2008 and 
2012. In each review, consistent findings and recommendations were made, 
particularly in relation to weaknesses with the Scheme’s governance and performance. 
While improvements to the Act have been made as a result of these reviews, little 
apparent action has occurred to address other significant problems, resulting in issues 
that have persisted unnecessarily. 
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Scheme governance 
While the Scheme has been operating for over 15 years, it has experienced, and 
continues to experience, governance problems that undermine its effectiveness and 
efficiency. These governance issues have been known since at least 2003, and were 
further identified in the 2008 and 2009 reviews, and the 2012 evaluation. While efforts 
have been made to address them, these have not been effective. 
Objective of the Scheme 
The objective of the Scheme is unclear, with multiple documents referencing different 
objectives. The current terms of reference for the Scheme's oversight committees 
detail objectives that differ from what the Scheme participants actually work towards. 
There is no documentation that provides evidence of a decision for the Scheme’s 
objectives to be changed to reflect the Act’s objectives. 
A draft set of objectives for the Scheme was developed and approved by the oversight 
committee in 2006, but not adopted. It is unclear why, despite being approved, these 
objectives were not adopted and did not drive the activities of the Scheme. 
Adding to the confusion, the 2009 review recommended to ACSEMG that different 
objectives be approved. While there was agreement to adopt them, again this did not 
occur, and there is no record to explain this.  
Coordination, accountability and leadership 
ACSEMG has failed to fulfil its oversight and leadership roles. In particular, it has not 
set a strategic focus for the Scheme, nor ensured that objectives are being achieved. 
This is because it has failed to implement a performance framework to assess the 
achievement of outcomes, and has not developed clear objectives or prepared a 
strategic plan. These are all issues that have been known since at least 2008.  
Between October 2010 and October 2012 ACSEMG did not meet. The lack of 
meetings was not planned and there is no documented or reasonable explanation for 
the interval. The Confiscation Operations Committee did not meet over the same 
two-year period. One obvious impact of not meeting for this duration is that the 
committees have missed opportunities to address the Scheme's weaknesses for two 
years. 
While DOJ is ultimately accountable for the Scheme, and performs a leadership role, 
the unclear governance arrangements mean that accountability and leadership are 
only notional. In practice, the Scheme includes two statutorily independent bodies, 
Victoria Police and OPP, over which DOJ has no control. This is not an ideal 
arrangement, and undermines the Scheme's governance. 
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Planning and resources 
Effective planning for asset confiscation does not occur at the Scheme level, and 
varies across the three agencies. Despite reviews since 2008 identifying the need to 
improve the Scheme’s strategic planning, no effective planning has been undertaken. 
There is no plan that brings together information about the Scheme’s opportunities and 
risks, that clarifies the objectives and outcomes, or how performance will be assessed. 
There is also no plan that establishes the Scheme’s direction or its priorities.  
The absence of effective planning is most notable at Victoria Police, which is 
essentially the driver of Scheme activity, and which therefore has a greater need for 
effective planning. Regular turnover of CPS staff—particularly its management—
makes strategic and business planning more critical. The overall success of the 
Scheme is heavily dependent on how effectively Victoria Police and CPS plan and 
perform. 
The CPS does not have any strategic or business plans, and other than at a high level, 
what it is tasked with doing is not clearly documented. It is not evident that CPS has 
undertaken or documented any assessments of the proceeds of crime-operating 
environments, including where there are opportunities, priorities, gaps or challenges. 
POC’s role in relation to asset confiscation is necessarily a reactive one, based on the 
assets that Victoria Police identifies for confiscation, and the number of supporting 
affidavits it sends to POC. Given this, its planning is partly reliant on there being 
effective planning at CPS. This would enable POC to understand the priorities and the 
active and planned investigations across Victoria Police, and to plan both strategically 
and operationally around these. 
Regardless of the lack of planning at CPS, POC itself does not have effective planning 
systems and processes in place. It has no strategic or business plans that detail the 
broader and longer-term issues impacting on its role, the external workload pressures, 
what it aims to achieve each year, its priorities or its resource needs.  
Like POC, ACO’s role is a reactive one as it responds to the orders that POC obtains 
in court. This presents the same challenges in terms of effective planning if the other 
stakeholders in the process are not planning. However, unlike either CPS or POC, 
DOJ and ACO have comprehensive planning around asset management and disposal 
activities—with some non-material weaknesses. 
Risk management 
Effective risk management is fundamental to public sector operations, as well as 
effective governance and planning. It enables entities and agencies to identify and 
manage risks and opportunities that may arise while performing their functions. 
Risk management across the Scheme and Victoria Police is inadequate to properly 
manage known risks. Risk management practices within the both POC and ACO are 
more advanced—both POC and ACO have developed risk management frameworks 
that identify risks pertinent to the functions they perform. 
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No adequate assessment of risks for the Scheme has been undertaken, and there is 
no risk management plan within CPS, even though a range of problems with the squad 
are well known to CPS and Victoria Police management. 
Scheme operation 
Victoria Police, and more specifically CPS, is responsible for identifying assets for 
confiscation. That Victoria Police has had a dedicated squad for many years is a 
positive development towards achieving the Scheme’s objectives, and it is evident that 
the CPS is performing asset confiscation work.  
However, issues relating to the type of investigations it undertakes, and how it 
undertakes them, along with administrative weaknesses around the prioritisation and 
allocation of cases, mean it is not operating as effectively or efficiently as it should.  
Investigations 
The Scheme's focus is on profit-motivated, serious and organised crime. Similarly, 
CPS considers that its focus is on the ‘upper echelons of organised crime’. However, in 
practice, up to 60 per cent of the CPS work relates to victims of crime.  
While victims’ compensation is a purpose of the Act, it is unclear why CPS is 
performing this function, at least to the current extent. This work is time intensive and 
anecdotally results in few victims pursuing the offender in court. The focus on this type 
of work detracts from what CPS should be focusing on—profit-motivated, serious and 
organised crime. 
Consideration needs to be given to whether it remains the responsible agency for 
working with victims of crime—particularly if the Scheme’s objectives are to be given 
every chance of being achieved. 
CPS has adequate investigative tools and sources of information available to 
undertake investigations to identify assets for confiscation. However, CPS is not 
making full use of its investigative tools, and may therefore be missing important 
assets. 
In addition, the way that CPS prioritises and allocates its cases creates a risk that 
prioritisation will not be undertaken appropriately and investigative action will not start 
in a timely way. The consequence is that assets may dissipate before action can be 
taken, reducing the likelihood of the Scheme's objectives being met. 
Restraining, managing and disposing of assets 
Restraining property, through the use of restraining orders, is an important stage in the 
asset confiscation process. Its purpose is to prevent the disposal of property so that it 
will be available for a potential forfeiture order, an automatic forfeiture, a pecuniary 
penalty order, or for restitution or compensation.  
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Broadly, this process involves POC applying for restraining orders in the County and 
Supreme Courts, and ACO identifying and securing the assets identified in the 
restraining order. Delays in obtaining restraining orders and securing assets increase 
the risk that the assets will be dissipated. 
While these agencies' functions are necessarily reactive—POC reacting to the 
outcome of CPS investigations, and ACO reacting to the outcome of the restraining 
order application process—both are performing this part of their roles effectively and 
efficiently. Similarly, the ACO’s practices and controls around the management, 
maintenance and disposal of forfeited assets are generally effective and economical, 
therefore minimising costs and maximising financial returns to the state. 
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
 The Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management 
Group should: 
 
1. develop a performance framework linked to the objectives of 
the Asset Confiscation Scheme that includes relevant and 
appropriate indicators that enable reported performance to be 
a fair representation of actual performance 
28 
2. identify and document actions required to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Asset Confiscation Scheme, 
including previously identified issues 
28 
3. develop an implementation plan that details the actions, 
accountability, time frames, resources, implementation risks 
and monitoring arrangements for these actions 
28 
9. clarify and confirm the objectives of the Asset Confiscation 
Scheme 
41 
10. update the terms of reference for the Asset Confiscation 
Scheme Executive Management Group and Confiscation 
Operations Committee, and schedule routine reviews so that 
they remain current 
41 
11. clarify and confirm the Asset Confiscation Scheme governance 
arrangements, including leadership, accountability, roles and 
responsibilities, and issue resolution mechanisms 
41 
12. undertake a risk assessment for the Asset Confiscation 
Scheme, including the risks associated with working in a 
joined-up arrangement 
41 
13. develop strategic and operational plans for the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme, linked to Asset Confiscation Scheme 
agency planning. 
41 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
 Victoria Police should:  
4. develop a performance framework, independent of the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme, to enable Victoria Police management 
to assess the performance of the Criminal Proceeds Squad 
28 
5. implement quality assurance processes around data and 
databases 
28 
14. develop strategic and operational plans, linked to those of 
Crime Command, the Asset Confiscation Scheme and other 
Asset Confiscation Scheme agencies 
41 
15. undertake a risk assessment of the Criminal Proceeds Squad 
and its operating environment 
41 
16. review the resourcing model for the Criminal Proceeds Squad, 
including the cost-effectiveness of using Victorian Public 
Service staff 
41 
18. refocus the Criminal Proceeds Squad's investigations to be 
predominantly focused on profit-motivated, serious and 
organised crime 
51 
19. reallocate responsibility across the organisation for assisting 
victims of crime in identifying and restraining assets 
51 
20. redevelop practices to ensure that investigative tools are used 
to their full potential 
51 
21. develop and implement a Criminal Proceeds Squad training 
strategy that includes consistent, compulsory inductions for 
new staff members 
51 
22. establish processes for the routine and regular review of 
criminal proceeds guidance 
51 
23. develop, document and enforce the consistent use of case 
prioritisation and allocation procedures  
51 
24. improve the way that the Criminal Proceeds Squad records 
prioritisation and allocation information to enable better 
management reporting. 
51 
 The Office of Public Prosecutions should: 
6. develop a performance framework, independent of the 
Scheme, to enable the Office of Public Prosecutions' 
management to assess the performance of the Proceeds of 
Crime directorate 
28 
7. implement quality assurance processes around data and 
databases 
28 
17. develop strategic and operational plans, linked to those of the 
Asset Confiscation Scheme and other Asset Confiscation 
Scheme agencies. 
41 
 The Department of Justice should: 
8. improve the current performance framework of the Asset 
Confiscation Operations unit to better enable the Department 
of Justice's management to assess its performance 
28 
25. review and update the procedures for the Asset Confiscation 
Operations unit. 
51 
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Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report, or relevant extracts from 
the report, was provided to the Department of Justice, the Office of Public 
Prosecutions and Victoria Police with a request for submissions or comments. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments are included in Appendix A. 
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1  Background 
1.1 Asset confiscation  
Asset confiscation is a tool that Victoria's law enforcement and public prosecution 
agencies use in response to criminal activity. The Confiscation Act 1997 (the Act) and 
associated regulations enable the state to confiscate property in order to deprive 
people of the proceeds of certain offences, to disrupt further criminal activity by 
preventing the use of that property, and to deter others from engaging in criminal 
activity. The Act also enables the state to preserve assets for victims' compensation 
and restitution. 
1.1.1 Offences  
Asset confiscation only applies to certain offences. The Act lists these offences, which 
are known as Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 offences. 
Schedule 1 offences are typically indictable offences and include offences related to 
various Acts, such as the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006, Casino Control Act 1991, 
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, Fisheries Act 1995, Racing Act 1958, and the 
Wildlife Act 1975. Schedule 1 offences also include all Schedule 2 offences. 
Schedule 2 offences are more serious, profit-motivated offences that contravene 
various Acts including the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981, 
Crimes Act 1958, and the Sex Work Act 1994. 
Offences under Schedule 2 typically relate to drug trafficking and cultivation, and apply 
to certain quantities, depending on the type of drug. The Drugs, Poisons and 
Controlled Substances Act 1981 determines these quantities. Other common 
Schedule 2 offences include those related to fraud, dishonesty and property where the 
value of one offence exceeds $50 000, and the value of multiple offences exceeds 
$75 000. 
1.1.2 Tainted assets 
Assets that the state seeks to confiscate through a forfeiture order not only need to 
relate to specific offences and thresholds, but also need to be tainted or reasonably 
suspected to be tainted. Tainted assets are those that have been derived wholly or 
substantially from the proceeds of crime, or have been used, or are intended to be 
used, in connection with a crime.  
The types of property that can be restrained and forfeited under the Act are 
wide-ranging and include houses, land, share portfolios, jewellery, motor cars and 
cash. 
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1.1.3 Forfeiture and restraining orders 
The most common tools available under the Act to achieve its objectives are 
restraining and forfeiture orders. 
Restraining orders 
Restraining orders are court orders that aim to preserve property, or an interest in 
property, so that it will be available for potential forfeiture, automatic forfeiture, a 
pecuniary penalty order, or to satisfy a compensation or restitution order related to a 
crime.  
A restraining order can be sought through both criminal and civil processes. For 
criminal matters, they can be sought within 48 hours of when the police intend to 
charge the accused, or can be sought when the police have charged the accused with 
either a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence.  
Civil forfeiture restraining orders may occur where there is no charge, or where 
someone charged has not been convicted. The purpose of civil forfeiture restraining 
orders is to satisfy a civil forfeiture order that may be made in relation to property that 
is reasonably suspected to be tainted by a Schedule 2 offence. A civil forfeiture 
restraining order can be sought at any time. 
Forfeiture orders 
Forfeiture orders are court orders that enable the state to confiscate and dispose of 
tainted property. There are two kinds of forfeiture orders—'discretionary' forfeiture and 
civil forfeiture. In addition, the Act also allows for automatic forfeiture. 
'Discretionary' forfeiture 
'Discretionary' forfeiture orders can be made by the court once the accused has been 
convicted of a Schedule 1 offence. A decision to obtain a forfeiture order must be made 
within six months of the conviction. 
The onus is on the state to show that the assets are tainted, and in this respect the 
court has discretion to award the order based on the evidence presented. A restraining 
order is not required for this forfeiture order, although it is commonly sought. 
Civil forfeiture  
A civil forfeiture restraining order can only be made in relation to a Schedule 2 offence. 
Obtaining such an order involves following civil court processes and does not require 
the defendant to be charged with a criminal offence, or to have been convicted.  
The onus is on the state to show that the assets are tainted or reasonably suspected of 
being tainted. It needs to demonstrate this on the balance of probabilities. Civil 
forfeiture orders must be sought within 90 days of a restraining order being made. 
Background 
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Automatic forfeiture 
Automatic forfeiture occurs once the accused is convicted of a Schedule 2 offence, 
subject to there being a restraining order and no pending applications for exclusions or 
exclusion orders. The court has no discretion in ordering forfeiture. If the accused 
disputes that the assets are tainted, the onus shifts to them to prove otherwise. 
Exclusions 
Restraining and forfeiture orders provide the state with significant power to affect a 
person's legal or equitable interest in property. To address this, the Act allows the 
accused and third parties with an interest in the asset to apply to the court to have any 
or all of the assets excluded. This can occur for restraining orders if done within 
30 days of the order being made, and for the forfeiture order and automatic forfeiture if 
done by a third party within 60 days of forfeiture. 
The court may exclude assets in several circumstances, including being satisfied that 
an asset is not tainted or derived from the crime. Even if the court considers the asset 
to be tainted, it can exclude a third party's interest in the asset. Typically, this would 
occur when the third party was not involved in the offence, had an interest in the asset 
before the offence, and did not know the asset would be used in an offence. The third 
party also needs to show that their interest in the property was not subject to the 
effective control of the accused. 
1.1.4 Other orders 
In addition to restraining and forfeiture orders, the asset confiscation regime also 
provides law enforcement and prosecution agencies with other orders to enable the 
Act's objectives to be met. These include pecuniary penalty orders (PPO) and property 
substitution declarations. 
Pecuniary penalty order 
After conviction of either a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence, the court may make a 
PPO. A PPO is a debt that the convicted person must pay the state, with the debt 
equal in value to benefits the accused derived from the offence. 
A PPO is a discretionary order, and the assessment of what constitutes a benefit 
derived from an offence is broad. It includes: 
• any money actually received from the offence 
• any property that was derived or realised 
• any benefit, service or financial advantage 
• any increase in the total value of property. 
For Schedule 2 offences, benefits also include all property in which the accused had 
an interest at the time of the application for the order, and all expenditure that the 
accused made in the preceding six years. 
Background 
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Property substitution declaration 
If the accused does not have an interest in an asset, it is not available for forfeiture. 
This is an issue where the accused used, for example, a rented property to commit an 
offence. In these situations, the Act allows for the state to apply for a property 
substitution declaration when it applies for a forfeiture order in relation to a 
Schedule 1 offence. The state can also seek a property substitution declaration for a 
Schedule 2 offence which, if made, will subject the accused's property to automatic 
forfeiture. A property substitution declaration essentially swaps assets the accused 
owns, for the assets used in the offence. This has the effect of making the accused's 
assets tainted. A key restriction is that the assets must be of the same nature or 
description, although they do not have to be of equal value. 
1.1.5 Victims’ compensation 
Under the Sentencing Act 1991, if a court finds an accused person guilty, or convicts 
them of an offence, a victim may seek a restitution order or a compensation order for 
pain and suffering, and property loss and damage.  
The Sentencing Act 1991 also allows restitution and compensation orders to be made 
on behalf of the victim. Specifically, it allows for the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
act on the victim's behalf in the County or Supreme Courts, or the police prosecutor or 
police informant in the Magistrates Court. 
The Act complements the Sentencing Act 1991, with one of its purposes being ‘to 
preserve assets for the purpose of restitution or compensation to victims of crime’. 
Where the Director of Public Prosecutions acts to restrain property on behalf of the 
victim, the value of the order needs to exceed $10 000. In addition, where the court 
orders the forfeiture of assets, any restitution or compensation orders must be dealt 
with as a priority. 
Where the court makes a restitution or compensation order, this is enforceable as a 
civil debt. The state generally does not enforce these as it does not have this power. 
1.2 Asset Confiscation Scheme 
The Asset Confiscation Scheme (the Scheme) was established in 1998, following the 
commencement of the Act. There are three key agencies that work together to achieve 
the objectives of the Scheme: Victoria Police, the Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP) 
and the Asset Confiscation Operations unit (ACO), which is part of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). In addition, the Scheme is supported by two committees: the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group (ACSEMG), and the Confiscation 
Operations Committee. 
Background 
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1.2.1 Victoria Police  
Victoria Police is the primary agency within the Scheme. It is responsible for 
investigating crime and identifying assets for confiscation. Asset confiscation should 
happen across all areas of Victoria Police, although it has a dedicated squad to deal 
exclusively with criminal proceeds and asset confiscation.  
Criminal Proceeds Squad 
The Criminal Proceeds Squad (CPS) is intended to assist other criminal investigation 
areas within Victoria Police to prepare the necessary legal documents for OPP, as well 
as undertaking its own proactive investigations. It operates within the Scheme, but 
does not exclusively service the Scheme. It is intended to: 
• provide timely and appropriate investigative support, response assistance and 
advice to all areas of the force in relation to the operation and application of the 
Act 
• conduct thorough asset investigations relative to all Schedule 2 offences 
• liaise with, and provide assistance to, outside agencies including interstate police, 
OPP and ACO 
• assist with searches where asset seizure and confiscation may occur 
• assist with the restraint of property for victim compensation or restitution. 
1.2.2 Office of Public Prosecutions 
OPP prosecutes serious criminal offences in Victoria’s County and Supreme Courts. 
Among its functions, it specialises in matters relating to asset confiscation. 
Proceeds of Crime directorate 
OPP has a dedicated unit—the Proceeds of Crime directorate (POC)—which deals 
exclusively with asset confiscation and matters arising under the Act. It typically reacts 
to matters referred to it by Victoria Police, but also works with other agencies, such as 
Fisheries Victoria. 
POC’s core function is to prepare, make and respond to all applications to court under 
the Act for restraining and exclusion orders, further orders and civil forfeiture orders. It 
also prepares and conducts appeals and judicial reviews arising out of confiscation 
proceedings. 
1.2.3 Department of Justice 
DOJ performs two roles in relation to the Scheme. It is the coordinating and 
accountable agency for Scheme, and is also responsible for dealing with restraining 
and forfeiture orders that the courts make. In this respect, it is the third and final part of 
the Scheme process. Through its criminal law policy unit, DOJ actively monitors the 
administration and operation of the Act and considers policy and legislative reforms for 
the Scheme. 
Background 
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Asset Confiscation Operations  
ACO is a business unit within DOJ. It has the primary responsibility for the 
management and governance of the Scheme, including reporting on outcomes, 
convening the Scheme’s executive and operational group meetings, and managing the 
Scheme’s trust fund, which holds on trust all restrained and forfeited property.  
ACO is also responsible for locating restrained assets, and their subsequent 
management, maintenance and disposal. It typically manages the higher value assets 
and financial assets such as bank accounts, share portfolios, luxury vehicles, boats, 
houses and land. 
Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group 
ACSEMG comprises senior staff from the three agencies. Fisheries Victoria also 
participates, given its interest in asset confiscation as part of its enforcement activities. 
ACSEMG has a broad remit, including responsibility for: 
• the overall performance of the Scheme in meeting its objectives 
• acting collegiately and collaboratively, on a fully informed basis with due diligence 
and care, and in the interests of the Scheme and the key agencies 
• setting the strategic focus of the Scheme to ensure the objectives are being 
achieved with satisfactory outcomes 
• receiving and endorsing performance reports prepared by the Confiscation 
Operations Committee and to provide any overall Scheme performance reports 
required by government 
• overseeing and advocating for the Scheme to be adequately resourced. 
Confiscation Operations Committee 
The Confiscation Operations Committee comprises operational staff from the three 
business units—CPS, POC and ACO—along with staff from Fisheries Victoria. The 
committee's purpose is to advise ACSEMG on strategic options that focus on the 
'effective utilisation and continual improvement' of the Scheme. Specific functions 
include: 
• addressing concerns relating to the operational, practical and administrative 
nature of the Scheme 
• promoting collaboration and coordination between participating agencies 
• enhancing the Scheme with increased efficiency and effectiveness. 
1.2.4 Asset Confiscation Scheme workflow 
The asset confiscation process is linear, with each agency required to fulfil its 
responsibilities before a case can be referred to the next agency. As Figure 1A shows, 
the process starts with Victoria Police and the investigative stage, followed by OPP 
and ending with ACO. 
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However, the nature of the process means that, typically, each agency continues to be 
involved throughout the life cycle of a matter. For example, while OPP’s initial 
involvement may be to obtain a court order, it may then become involved again after 
an asset is restrained if a party seeks to exclude a portion of the asset. 
Figure 1A 
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Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
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1.3 Asset Confiscation Scheme funding and 
resources 
1.3.1 Funding 
The Scheme has historically been funded through appropriations, comprising ongoing 
base funding, and supplementary funding. Between 2009–10 and 2012–13, Scheme 
participants received around $40 million over four years. 
As Figure 1B shows, this comprised $26 million of ongoing funding, used to fund core 
activities. A further $14 million was provided to supplement this. The majority of this 
funding was provided to OPP to employ solicitors in POC. Supplementary funding was 
also provided to key stakeholders not part of the Scheme, such as the Magistrates and 
County Courts, and Victorian Legal Aid. 
  Figure 1B
Asset Confiscation Scheme funding 2009–10 to 2012–13  
Scheme agencies 
2009–10 
$000s 
2010–11 
$000s 
2011–12 
$000s 
2012–13 
$000s 
Total 
$000s 
Criminal Proceeds Squad 917  942  966  990  3 815  
Proceeds of Crime directorate 1 451  1 492  1 528  1 566  6 037  
Asset Confiscation Operations unit 524  539  553  566   2 182  
Victorian Legal Aid 232  238  244  250  964  
Magistrates Court 232  238  244  250  964  
County Court 83  85  87  90  345  
Total supplementary 3 439  3 534  3 622  3 712  14 307  
Total base funding 6 500 6 500 6 500 6 500 26 000 
Total Scheme funding 9 939 10 034 10 122 10 212 40 307 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
In May 2013, the government changed the way that the Scheme was funded by 
making all funding ongoing, rather than the mix of ongoing and time-limited 
supplementary funding. The Scheme will now receive $53.5 million over four years, 
from 2013–14 to 2016–17—an increase of around $13 million. 
1.3.2 Resources 
Following the provision of the additional funding in May 2013, the Scheme agencies 
are expected to increase their staff by 12, bringing the total to 68. This includes two 
forensic accountants and one legal administrative assistant for the CPS, and eight 
solicitors and one legal administrative assistant for POC. 
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As of 1 June 2013, the Scheme operates with 56 staff across the three agencies. This 
includes: 
• CPS—31 staff, comprising 30 sworn police officers and one administrator  
• POC—14 staff, comprising 10 solicitors, two legal administrative assistants and 
two seconded forensic accountants 
• ACO—11 administrative staff. 
1.4 Asset Confiscation Scheme activity 
On behalf of the Scheme, ACO collates activity data related to the operations of POC 
and ACO. The following data is based on the June 2013 Asset Confiscation Scheme 
statistical report, which may not be comparable to previous reports. This is because of 
the ACO practice of retrospectively updating data relating to asset values once a 
formal valuation is obtained. Given this, the data should be treated as indicative only. 
From 2007–08 until June 2013, the Scheme has restrained around $434 million in 
assets. On average, 79 per cent of these assets are real property, such as houses and 
land. As Figure 1C shows, since peaking in 2008–09 at $121 million, the gross value of 
restrained assets has declined, with restrained assets totalling $55.2 million in  
2012–13. 
  Figure 1C
Gross value of restrained assets, 2007–08 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
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Figure 1D shows the gross value of forfeited assets. This reflects the value of assets 
that have been forfeited to the state after third parties have had their interests 
excluded.  
Because court cases and exclusions can take, on average, around two years to 
complete, there is a disconnect between the assets restrained in one year and the 
assets forfeited in that same year. For example, in Figures 1C and 1D, there is little 
correlation between what was restrained in 2011–12 and what was forfeited in  
2011–12. Therefore, these graphs only show the activity in a particular year. 
Apart from 2010–11, which ACO considers was disproportionately high due to 
two cases, the gross value of forfeited assets is regularly significantly less than the 
value of restrained assets. This generally reflects the exclusion process provided for in 
the Act. 
  Figure 1D
Gross value of forfeited assets, 2007–08 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
Figures 1E and 1F show the number and type of assets that have been restrained and 
forfeited. The same limitations around comparing years apply, as they do for the value 
of assets.  
Reflecting the decrease in the value of assets restrained, the number of assets 
restrained has also declined since 2008–09. The most common type of asset 
restrained is real property, followed by bank accounts and what ACO categorise as 
'other'. This is typically personal property that the police seize and hold for evidentiary 
purposes such as jewellery, whitegoods and other household items. The next most 
common assets restrained are vehicles and cash. 
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While there has been a decline in the number of restrained assets, the number of 
assets forfeited has increased since 2007–08, nearly doubling by the end of 2011–12. 
However, most of this increase is related to 'other' property. Forfeited real property has 
steadily decreased over this time period. Data for 2012–13 shows a significant decline 
in assets forfeited. The type of assets forfeited generally reflects that pattern for 
restrained assets. 
  Figure 1E
Number and type of restrained assets, 2007–08 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
  Figure 1F
Number and type of forfeited assets, 2007–08 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
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The major beneficiaries of forfeited assets are the state, through transfers to the 
consolidated fund, and victims granted restitution or compensation orders under the 
Sentencing Act 1991. 
Figure 1G shows the value of payments made to both the consolidated fund and 
victims. Since 2007–08, the Scheme has returned around $82 million to the 
consolidated fund, and around $108 million since 1998–99. The Scheme has also 
returned around $14 million to victims since 2007–08, and around $17 million since 
2000–01. 
  Figure 1G
Payments made to the consolidated fund and victims, 2007–08 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Department of Justice data. 
1.5 Audit objective and scope 
The audit objective was to assess how effective, efficient and economical the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme is in achieving the objectives of the Confiscation Act 1997.  
To address this objective, the audit assessed the: 
• arrangements in place to identify and restrain property 
• arrangements in place to manage and dispose of forfeited property 
• Asset Confiscation Scheme’s governance arrangements. 
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1.6 Audit method and cost 
The audit was conducted under section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and in accordance 
with the Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards.  
Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, unless otherwise indicated, any 
persons named in this report are not the subject of adverse comment or opinion. 
The total cost was $332 000. 
1.7 Structure of the report 
Part 2 examines how well the Scheme and agencies have performed, the performance 
frameworks for the Scheme and also discusses three Scheme reviews. 
Part 3 examines the governance arrangements for the Scheme, including leadership, 
accountability, planning and risk management. 
Part 4 examines the roles of the three Scheme agencies, including the identification, 
restraint and disposal of assets. 
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2  Scheme performance 
At a glance 
Background  
Monitoring and reporting performance is a key element of effective governance and 
public sector accountability. Public sector entities have a responsibility to monitor and 
report on whether they use public funds effectively, efficiently and economically. 
Conclusion 
While asset confiscation activity is clearly occurring, it is not possible to assess 
whether this is occurring as effectively, efficiently or economically as it should. It is also 
not possible to assess whether the Asset Confiscation Scheme (the Scheme) is 
meeting its objectives and outcomes. 
This is because there is no performance framework in place. Persistent weaknesses 
with the operation of the Scheme, known since 2008, strongly indicate that the 
Scheme is not well placed to achieve its objectives and perform at the required 
standard. 
Findings  
• How well the Scheme is performing is unknown as it lacks an effective 
performance framework, despite the Department of Justice’s commitment ten 
years ago to develop one. 
• Consistent findings and recommendations have been made in three 
commissioned reviews between 2008 and 2012, particularly in relation to 
weaknesses with the Scheme’s governance and performance. 
Recommendations 
• The Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group should develop a 
performance framework linked to the objectives of the Scheme. 
• Victoria Police and the Office of Public Prosecutions should develop performance 
frameworks to enable their management to assess performance. 
• The Department of Justice should improve its performance framework to better 
enable its management to assess the performance of the Asset Confiscation 
Operations unit. 
Scheme performance 
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2.1 Introduction 
Monitoring and reporting performance is a key element of effective governance and 
public sector accountability. Public sector entities have a responsibility to monitor and 
report on whether they use public funds efficiently and economically to achieve 
intended outcomes and objectives. Effective performance monitoring and reporting 
should also enable an agency’s management to track performance and act to address 
underperformance when detected. 
To effectively monitor performance, public sector entities need to have clearly 
articulated objectives, outcomes and outputs. They also need to have performance 
indicators that provide information on whether the entity is achieving what it said it 
would.  
These performance indicators need to be relevant and appropriate. A relevant indicator 
is one that has a logical and consistent relationship to the entity’s objectives, and that 
the entity is responsible for achieving. An appropriate indicator is one that is 
underpinned by sufficient information to assess its achievement against objectives, 
outcomes and outputs. This includes assessing trends over time and against 
predetermined benchmarks. 
2.2 Conclusion 
While asset confiscation activity is clearly occurring, it is not possible to assess 
whether this is occurring as effectively, efficiently or economically as it should. It is also 
not possible to assess whether the Asset Confiscation Scheme (the Scheme) is 
meeting its objectives and outcomes. 
This is because there is no performance framework in place for the Scheme, or within 
the three key agencies. A performance framework for the whole Scheme has been 
under consideration for a decade, and is no closer to being established. 
Three commissioned reviews since 2008 have identified persistent weaknesses with 
the operation of the Scheme, consistent with the findings of this audit, that strongly 
indicate the Scheme is not well placed to achieve its objectives and perform at the 
required standard. It is a significant failing that many of these weaknesses have not 
been addressed over an extended time frame. 
2.3 Asset Confiscation Scheme performance 
How well the Scheme is performing is unknown as it lacks an effective performance 
framework. Exacerbating this is the absence of effective performance frameworks 
within the individual agencies which means they are unable to determine how 
effectively or efficiently they are performing.  
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2.3.1 Scheme performance framework 
2003 VAGO special review 
The need for a performance framework to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the Scheme was first identified in VAGO’s 2003 Report on Public Sector Agencies. The 
recommendation to develop overarching performance measures was accepted by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Despite DOJ's commitment ten years ago to develop overarching performance 
measures for the Scheme, this has not yet occurred. This is despite effort over this 
time to develop performance measures. 
A project team was established in 2006 to create key performance indicators for the 
Scheme. There were a range of consultations, primarily with the Scheme participants, 
Fisheries Victoria (part of the Department of Environment and Primary Industries) and 
the courts. The project team identified 17 key indicators, three potential indicators and 
17 secondary indicators for the Scheme. 
However, the performance framework was never established. There is no clear 
rationale for this inaction over the extended time period, and without a performance 
framework it is not possible to determine whether the Scheme is achieving its 
objectives. 
Currently, apart from annual reporting, there is limited monitoring of activity data. While 
the Scheme agencies previously provided regular activity data to DOJ's Asset 
Confiscation Operations unit (ACO) to compile and report to the various oversight 
committees, this does not happen routinely. Victoria Police does not provide any data 
to ACO for collating, while the Office of Public Prosecutions' (OPP) Proceeds of Crime 
directorate (POC) provides data when requested. This demonstrates a breakdown in 
processes and highlights the lack of importance placed on monitoring across the 
Scheme.  
Budget Paper No. 3 measures 
The Scheme’s performance is reflected in one output measure in the budget papers. 
This measure is ‘assets converted in 90 days’. This measure is not relevant, as it has 
no logical and consistent relationship to the Scheme’s objectives. It is also not relevant 
because the Scheme is not responsible for achieving it. Rather, one agency—ACO—is 
responsible for it. The measure is also not appropriate as it cannot be used to assess 
achievement against the Scheme’s objectives. The measure does not, therefore, fairly 
represent the actual performance of the Scheme. 
DOJ and the Scheme’s agencies have recognised the limitations of this measure and 
have proposed two new measures that they believe better reflect the Scheme’s stated 
objectives: 
• ‘the gross value of restrained assets’  
• ‘net proceeds from confiscated outcomes’.  
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These measures better reflect the activities of the Scheme’s agencies and more 
logically relate to the Scheme’s objectives. This is particularly true for the objectives of 
deprivation and disruption, as restrained and forfeited assets have a logical link to 
depriving an offender of the use of assets, and disrupting the offender from using the 
assets in further criminal activity. However, demonstrating deterrence is not possible 
with the proposed measures, as a measure involving monetary value cannot assess 
the extent to which a potential offender did or did not commit an offence. 
The new measures were intended to be included in Budget Paper No. 3 (BP3) for 
2013–14. However, due to uncertainty around funding for the Scheme, they were held 
over until the 2014–15 reporting year. Both measures will have targets of the average 
gross values over a five year period. For 2012–13, this was to be $72.9 million for 
gross value and $16.4 million for net proceeds. 
Section 139A reports to the minister 
Section 139A of the Confiscation Act 1997 (the Act) requires ACO and Victoria Police 
to report to the Attorney-General on some aspects of the operation of the Act. These 
are the number of times freezing orders and information notices, which are requests to 
financial institutions for information, have been used. This report is also required to be 
tabled in Parliament.  
ACO goes beyond this legislative requirement and provides an annual report to the 
minister that includes information on revenue from forfeited assets, activity data around 
the number of restraining orders and the value of specific classes of assets. 
Providing additional information is a positive initiative and increases the transparency 
of the Scheme. However, the report does not assess the Scheme’s performance. This 
is because the information relates only to the activities of two of the agencies and there 
are no targets or measures against which to compare or assess performance against 
outcomes. 
Victoria Police provides a one page report to the Attorney-General in line with the 
legislative requirements, although there are potential issues around the reliability of 
data contained in the report. It contains data for activities that the Criminal Proceeds 
Squad (CPS) knows about, but it does not include information notices issued outside 
of CPS and not reported to it. Given weaknesses with data management and quality 
assurance within CPS, it is not possible to identify whether the reported data is 
complete and accurate. In 2011–12, Victoria Police identified a discrepancy of around 
7 000 information notices added to the Attorney-General’s report. While Victoria Police 
identified this as a one-off error, the lack of any quality assurance around the data 
means Victoria Police cannot be confident that this is, or will remain, a one-off. 
The value of the section 139A reports is also questionable. While it is a requirement 
under the Act to produce these and subsequently table them in Parliament, they do not 
contain any meaningful data analysis. It is unclear how, or if, they are used to assess 
the effectiveness, efficiency or economy of the Scheme. 
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Annual statistical report 
ACO produces an annual statistical report for the two Scheme oversight committees: 
the Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group (ACSEMG) and the 
Confiscation Operations Committee. The report is similar to ACO’s section 139A report, 
in that it contains a broad range of trended activity data. However, this report also lacks 
targets against which to assess performance, and is therefore unable to be used to 
assess overall Scheme performance. Moreover, it only includes data related to the 
activities of POC and ACO, which means the report does not reflect the full activities of 
the Scheme. 
2.3.2 Agency performance frameworks 
In addition to a Scheme performance framework, each agency should also have a 
performance framework to inform its management about how effectively and efficiently 
asset confiscation activities are being undertaken. 
While elements of performance frameworks were evident for ACO and POC, none of 
the three Scheme agencies had effective frameworks that enabled an assessment of 
performance.  
Criminal Proceeds Squad 
Victoria Police has no performance framework or measures that enable it to assess its 
performance in relation to criminal proceeds and asset confiscation. While the budget 
papers and annual reports typically include performance information, albeit output 
rather than outcome focused, neither of these documents have measures for Victoria 
Police’s role in asset confiscation.  
There are no measures or indicators within Crime Command (formerly the Crime 
Department), of which CPS is a part. Similarly, CPS has no measures or indicators for 
any of its activities with which to assess its performance. 
Informal activity monitoring occurs, although the nature of the monitoring is limited. 
Monthly activity reports are generated by CPS administrative staff and provided to the 
Officer in Charge. This data provides a snapshot of the current status. This includes 
information on the number of active cases, the number of restraining orders to date 
and the value of the restrained property to date.  
However, there are no targets against which to compare the activity against, and as 
such the data reported does not provide any meaningful assessment of how CPS is 
performing.  
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The only form of management reporting on performance is the informal activity 
monitoring described above. No action is taken in relation to it, and it is typically read 
for noting purposes only.  
There are gaps in management reporting, with CPS identifying the inability of its 
systems to produce data on squad activity and performance, including: 
• the number of CPS-actioned files, i.e. proactive investigations, is not recorded 
• the type of referral, i.e. investigation or victim referral, is not available through any 
reporting system but can be obtained by manual count, which is regarded as time 
consuming 
• the average time for allocation, i.e. the number of days between the referral date 
and file allocation date, is not recorded 
• the average time for case completion by type, i.e. the number of days between 
the allocation date and the completion date, is unavailable or not recorded 
• the time taken to serve restraining orders on defendants and entities, i.e. banks, 
involved in restraining assets, is not available or not recorded. 
If this data was available it would provide CPS management with valuable information 
about the effectiveness and efficiency of the squad. Victoria Police has subsequently 
advised that it is taking steps to improve its reporting capability, although 
implementation is dependent on design complexity, the availability of existing 
applications, and the cost of implementation. 
Victoria Police advised that the performance of CPS is monitored through plans for the 
Crime Command Serious Crime Portfolio, which map to the Victoria Police Blueprint 
2012–2015. It also advised that it was satisfied that the performance of CPS against 
the Victoria Police Blueprint is being assessed through the existing Crime Command 
planning and risk framework.  
There is no performance management framework in place that would enable Crime 
Command or the Officer in Charge of CPS to understand whether CPS is performing 
its work effectively, efficiently and economically. Such performance frameworks are 
fundamental to effective governance and public administration. 
The data that CPS produces and reports is unreliable. CPS operates two databases 
for its investigations—ASIS and Interpose—but there is no consistent approach to 
using these databases among CPS staff, nor is there any quality control. This has 
resulted in the two databases reporting different numbers of case files, when there 
should be no difference. 
Extracting the data for management reporting is a manual exercise—an approach that 
increases the risk of error and the production of unreliable data. CPS is in the process 
of migrating data from the ASIS system to the Interpose system, which should improve 
data reliability issues by minimising the opportunities for error. 
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Proceeds of Crime directorate 
POC also does not have a performance framework that encompasses performance 
measures, targets and outcomes to enable it to assess how effectively and efficiently it 
is operating. 
OPP includes comprehensive output performance measures for its activities in its 
annual report, internal business planning reports and BP3 reports. These measures 
indirectly capture the work of POC, but it is not possible to disaggregate this for asset 
confiscation. 
The only performance-related data that POC collects is activity data. This includes 
data that POC reports to the Scheme when requested, such as the number of 
restraining order applications, the number of court hearings and the number of 
exclusion applications. This data measures activities only and not performance, and 
without appropriate benchmarks or targets against which to judge performance, 
provides little meaningful information.  
POC also collects timeliness data for restraining orders within its databases. This 
includes data on the date case files were created, when draft affidavits were received 
from CPS and when they were allocated to a solicitor. However, there is no routine 
analysis of this data or reporting to management.  
There are also weaknesses with this data. First, it is manually collated, which 
increases the risk of error. Errors were evident with duplicate entries and data that 
indicate that affidavits were allocated before they had been received. In addition, there 
is data missing. This highlights the lack of any quality control mechanisms, and 
ultimately diminishes the usefulness of the data as a management reporting tool with 
which to assess aspects of POC’s performance. Again, without timeliness targets or 
benchmarks, it is not possible to assess actual performance. 
POC has recognised limitations in its management reporting and, as part of developing 
a new information management system, has requested additional activity-based 
management reports. In addition, during this audit OPP started work to develop a 
performance framework that would enable performance to be assessed against POC 
outputs and outcomes. 
POC collates and reports some management information, which it considers enables it 
to assess its performance. This information includes consultations and meetings with 
staff, staff performance reviews, and caseload and workload reports. Staff performance 
reviews do not typically form part of an agency’s performance framework, as they do 
not enable an assessment of how an agency is performing in relation to the 
achievement of its objectives. Performance reviews focus on the individual and 
whether they are meeting their performance standards. They also focus on learning 
and development needs. 
Caseload and workload reports—while important management tools—do not provide 
adequate information on whether POC is achieving its objectives and outcomes. 
Rather, they report on another dimension of activity. 
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Asset Confiscation Operations 
While ACO has elements of a performance framework, it is not adequate to enable it to 
assess its performance for all its functions. ACO collects and reports internally on the 
gross value of assets restrained and also the value of funds transferred to consolidated 
revenue. There are no targets that form part of a Scheme performance framework, and 
therefore this information only provides an indication of activity. While DOJ advised 
that its finance unit has a target for gross funds forfeited, this is primarily for estimating 
revenue for accounting purposes and not Scheme performance. 
ACO also collects data relating to the management of real property, which represents 
around 80–90 per cent of the property it manages in most years. This data includes the 
timeliness of lodging restraining orders with Land Victoria, and the timeliness of 
property sale. 
For the lodgement of restraining orders, the ACO has identified two 
benchmarks---lodgement within three days and lodgement in five days. Only by 
analysing the results is it apparent that performance relates to the five days, and it is 
unclear what purpose the three day benchmark serves, given that the ACO is required 
to lodge restraining orders within five days. However, there is no target number for 
lodgement for either of the benchmarks.  
Analysis of actual performance data indicates that for 2011–12, 74 per cent of 
restraining orders were lodged within five days, with the average time taken being 
6.5 days. However, the data contains five outliers (46, 46, 64, 62, and 62 days 
respectively). If these are removed from the 111 cases, then the average time taken is 
reduced to 4.2 days, which is within the benchmark.  
ACO also collects data on the timeliness of sale of real property where the 
Attorney-General is on the title. This data appropriately excludes a range of other 
properties such as mortgagee sales or where buy-backs are in progress. The target for 
these sales is included in the performance measure reported in both BP3 and DOJ’s 
Annual Report. This measure is ‘assets converted within 90 days of the asset 
conversion cycle’, with a target of 85 per cent.  
Using this measure for the sale of real property is problematic. First, the measure 
relates to all forfeited property, including large volumes of low value personal property. 
Typically, ACO does not manage or dispose of this property type. Victoria Police is 
responsible for this, and personal property is easier to dispose of. Second, forfeited 
property may only be disposed of after 60 days once the forfeiture order has been 
made. This is the period available for interested parties to seek exclusion of the 
property, from forfeiture. This leaves only 30 days for 85 per cent of real property to be 
sold to meet the target. The data shows that since 2005, only one property has 
achieved the target of 90 days, and that was in 2007. Since then only one other 
property has come close—94 days in 2010. The average number of days is 273. 
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The ACO has identified the weaknesses with this measure as it relates to the disposals 
it is responsible for. As outlined earlier, it has recommended that the measure be 
changed to the gross value of restrained assets. However, this measure has been 
recommended for the Scheme and in the event it is used from 2014–15, will leave the 
ACO without any measure to assess its performance.  
2.4 Asset Confiscation Scheme reviews and 
evaluations 
Self-assessments of an agency or program’s effectiveness and efficiency are an 
important element of effective governance. They provide decision-makers with 
information about what is working, what is not working and what action needs to be 
taken to address any areas of concern. 
The Scheme has been subjected to three commissioned reviews in the five years 
between 2008 and 2012. Consistent findings and recommendations have been made 
in each, particularly in relation to weaknesses with the Scheme’s governance and 
performance. While improvements to the Act have been made as a result of these 
reviews, little apparent action has occurred to address other significant issues over 
time, resulting in issues that have persisted unnecessarily. 
2.4.1 2008 and 2009 reviews 
2008 review 
In 2008, DOJ initiated a review to assess the legislative and policy framework, and 
governance arrangements for managing and operating the Scheme. The review was 
also intended to position the Scheme to achieve its objectives into the future. The 
review identified weaknesses with the Scheme, including: 
• legislative framework—the Act’s principles were not well understood and each 
agency differed in how it interpreted the legislation 
• Scheme objectives—they were not well defined or articulated, or aligned with 
agency objectives 
• accountability—ultimate responsibility for the Scheme was unclear and lacked a 
strategic focus, however, agencies worked well together operationally 
• governance—communication was variable between agencies, roles were 
unclear, duplication existed and there was a lack of accountability for outcomes. 
While the review identified performance issues, it was primarily a proposal for a new 
governance structure for the Scheme, based on an integrated model involving police 
investigators, financial analysts/investigators, legal specialists, property/asset 
management and administration. This proposal was approved in principle by the 
Attorney-General and considered by the government. The government did not approve 
the proposal due to the costs of establishing a new entity. Despite the lack of 
government support, the government commissioned a further review of the Scheme 
and its governance. 
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2009 review 
The purpose of the 2009 review was to fulfil a request by the Premier for the 
Attorney-General and the Treasurer to develop options for reforming the Scheme. The 
need for reform was identified in the 2008 review. This review was to consider creating 
an independent ACO, as well as transferring the role of recovery and disposal of 
confiscated assets to the State Revenue Office (SRO). It was also to consider the 
potential for each model to improve outcomes in terms of disrupting and dismantling 
organised crime, and the implications for government revenue.  
While the Premier requested a review that considered creating a separate entity, the 
Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) advised DOJ that funding for more 
substantive reforms was unlikely to be provided in the 2009–10 budget cycle. As a 
result, DOJ focused on improving the existing governance arrangements, with a 
longer-term objective to revisit the preferred single entity governance model.  
As part of the work to improve existing governance arrangements, the review identified 
weaknesses with the Scheme. These included: 
• governance—the oversight committee did not meet regularly or on a scheduled 
basis, resulting in no clear decision-making mechanism for the Scheme  
• accountability—there was unclear responsibility for Scheme oversight and 
unclear accountability for achieving objectives 
• Scheme objectives—there was a lack of clearly articulated strategic objectives, 
leading to misalignment of agency goals and hindering the coordination of 
resources 
• performance—there was no overall performance monitoring for the Scheme, 
even though a project team was established in 2006 to develop key performance 
indicators 
• structure—while scope exists for further marginal improvements to the efficiency 
of the Scheme's operations through administrative amendments, significant 
changes to the efficiency and effectiveness of the Scheme require more 
substantive structural and legislative reforms. 
A three staged approach was developed to implement changes that would improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Scheme. This approach included: 
• identifying changes to the Scheme that would improve performance and 
coordination without additional investment from the government  
• developing an implementation plan for the recommended short-to-medium term 
course of action  
• identifying more substantive reforms to be revisited upon the review of the 
implementation of reforms in the short-to-medium term. 
These stages and the associated actions are detailed in Figure 2A. 
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  Figure 2A
Implementation actions to improve Scheme performance, 2009 
Stage Governance and accountability Workflow efficiencies 
Stage 1— 
short term  
(0–6 months)  
Changes that can 
be actioned now, 
without legislative 
change or wider 
government 
assistance/approval. 
Enhance strategic oversight and 
coordination by reconvening the Confiscation 
Operations Committee and Asset 
Confiscation Scheme Executive 
Management Group (ACSEMG): 
• agree on objectives 
• formalise meeting schedule 
• clarify strategic role(s) 
• augment existing data collection and 
reporting to improve data on Scheme 
performance and assist any future 
reforms: 
• requires business analyst (one). 
Target inefficiencies in the process of 
responding to applications for exclusion 
by providing a role for ACO in 
investigative accounting: 
• requires investigative accountant 
resources (two) 
• memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) involving Victoria Police, ACO 
and SRO for assistance and 
information sharing in cases 
involving complex property and trust 
arrangements (where SRO has 
significant expertise and access to 
data). 
Stage 2— 
medium term  
(6–12 months)  
Changes that 
may be desirable 
following review 
of changes 
implemented in 
Stage 1. These 
changes may also 
require some 
legislative 
amendments. 
Following increased data collection on 
performance, review performance data in 
order to: 
• establish key performance indicators and 
targets 
• these should be limited in number 
and recognised as being within the 
control of the relevant agencies 
• review adequacy of resource allocations, 
and if necessary build a case for 
additional positions 
• no legislative change required. 
Review investigative role provided for 
ACO in Stage 1, with consideration of: 
• increasing investigative role of ACO 
• using the Office of Chief Examiner 
for examinations at the 
commencement of confiscation 
proceedings, to assist in rebutting 
applications for exclusion 
• may require legislative changes 
• review MoU arrangements with SRO 
with a view to extending, revising 
and discontinuing. 
Stage 3— 
long term  
(>1 year)  
Substantial changes 
to the legislative 
framework and/or 
structure of the 
Scheme. To be 
considered following 
the initial reforms 
and the outcomes 
of the current 
legislative review. 
These changes 
will need to be 
supported by robust 
evidence from 
performance data. 
Revisit case for structural reforms combining 
(or separating) some or all of the current 
Scheme functions. This may include:  
• establishing a fully integrated business 
unit combining the functions of the 
agencies, or partial integration or 
collocation of POC and ACO 
• separating civil and criminal confiscation 
processes 
• assessing the adequacy of Scheme 
resources 
• exploring options for increasing the 
availability and use of civil powers, for 
example: 
• structural amendments (including 
establishing an integrated business 
unit) 
• legislative amendments. 
A key consideration for any future changes 
will be the need to ensure that they are 
consistent with the Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities. 
 
Source: Department of Justice. 
Scheme performance 
 
26       Asset Confiscation Scheme Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
Despite the development of an implementation plan being a key task, this was never 
done. While the three-stage process identifies actions to address some of the key 
issues, it does not address them all. Without an implementation plan, it has not been 
possible to clearly identify which of these actions was implemented and the timeliness 
and effectiveness of any implementation.  
It is evident that investigative accountants were employed (Stage 1) and legislative 
change was made (Stage 3). In addition, there is evidence of decisions not to continue 
with changes involving the SRO (Stage 1) and structural reform; the latter after the 
election of the government in 2010. However, there is insufficient evidence to 
determine the outcome of the other actions.  
2012 evaluation  
The purpose of this evaluation, commissioned by DOJ, was to address a DTF 
requirement that requests to extend lapsing funding be accompanied by an evaluation 
that assessed the effectiveness of the funding. Prior to the 2013–14 State Budget, the 
Scheme was part funded through four-yearly lapsing funding. In this respect, the 
evaluation differs from the other reviews, which were focused on the effectiveness of 
the operation of the Scheme and whether reform was required.  
Consistent with the 2008 and 2009 reviews, the evaluation identified a range of 
weaknesses with the current Scheme arrangements. That weaknesses consistent with 
those identified four years earlier have persisted highlights a significant failing. Scheme 
weaknesses identified in 2012 included: 
• the key performance indicators for the Scheme have not been quantified 
• there is no overarching risk framework for the Scheme 
• governance arrangements are not as effective and efficient as they could be  
• there is no single point of responsibility for the Scheme 
• membership of the oversight committees is too big 
• data systems across the agencies are incompatible 
• agencies are not collocated, even though they need to work closely together 
• organisational priorities do not necessarily match the Scheme's priorities. 
The evaluation concluded that the Scheme had been effective in targeting 
profit-motivated crime, although the evaluators state it was not possible to assess the 
magnitude of the effectiveness. The evaluation also concluded that the Scheme was 
efficient, as it was self-funding and returned more to government than the funding it 
had received.  
Despite the evaluation's conclusions, the identified weaknesses indicate that the 
Scheme is not operating effectively and efficiently as it should. In addition, there are 
weaknesses with the evaluation itself that further diminish the reliance that can be 
placed on the conclusions around effectiveness and efficiency. 
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Evaluation weaknesses 
The evaluation relies on measures that are not relevant to assessing the effectiveness 
of the Scheme. They are primarily activity based, such as the number of cases, gross 
and net value of assets, the number of assets, victims’ compensation and the net 
return to government. It also uses financial data—gross value of restrained assets— 
which does not provide an appropriate measure of the Scheme’s  
effectiveness—something the same authors identified in the 2009 review. The 
evaluation also does not evaluate performance with reference to any benchmarks or 
targets. 
The evaluation notes that there had been a decrease in the number of cases, and a 
corresponding increase in the gross value of assets restrained. The data provided for 
this audit supports this view. The review suggests that this may be for a number of 
reasons, including:  
• cases being investigated are more complex and involve higher-value assets 
• the increasingly complex organisational structures being created to avoid asset 
confiscation associated with crimes  
• a refocus on the Scheme's activities from low-value, high-volume cases to 
high-value, low-volume cases  
• that it is becoming increasingly difficult for authorities such as Victoria Police to 
identify and investigate, as criminals and their operations are becoming more 
sophisticated. 
These claims are not substantiated, or based on sufficient or appropriate evidence, 
and are generally not supported by the evidence obtained for this audit.  
The evaluation states that impacts of the Scheme on the three objectives of the Act are 
as follows:  
• the Scheme helps to disrupt crime, evidenced by increased revenue to the state 
and payments to victims 
• the Scheme helps to deter crime though the existence of civil forfeiture 
powers---although not necessarily the use of civil forfeiture powers 
• more could be done to deter, disrupt and deprive—this includes a more targeted 
approach, including more serious, higher-level crime.  
These stated impacts are based only on discussions with agencies and are 
unsupported by corroborating evidence. While case studies included in the 
government’s Budget and Expenditure Review Committee business case illustrate 
activity around asset confiscation, they do not by themselves demonstrate the 
outcomes that the evaluation identified. The evaluation includes an assessment of 
costs involved in managing property, but otherwise provides no clear assessment of 
the overall efficiency of the Scheme other than its assessment about overall costs and 
revenue. 
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The evaluation also discusses governance issues, although it is questionable what 
analysis of evidence has actually been undertaken. This is most obvious in relation to 
ACSEMG—the Scheme’s coordinating and oversight group. The evaluation notes that 
ACSEMG meets five times every year. However, analysis of meeting minutes 
demonstrates that the committee did not meet for two years between October 2010 
and October 2012. The Confiscation Operations Committee—another coordinating and 
oversight group focused on operational rather than strategic matters—also did not 
meet over the same period. 
Recommendations 
The Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group should: 
1. develop a performance framework linked to the objectives of the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme that includes relevant and appropriate indicators that 
enable reported performance to be a fair representation of actual performance 
2. identify and document actions required to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the Asset Confiscation Scheme, including previously identified issues 
3. develop an implementation plan that details the actions, accountability, time 
frames, resources, implementation risks and monitoring arrangements for these 
actions. 
Victoria Police should: 
4. develop a performance framework, independent of the Asset Confiscation 
Scheme, to enable Victoria Police management to assess the performance of the 
Criminal Proceeds Squad 
5. implement quality assurance processes around data and databases. 
The Office of Public Prosecutions should: 
6. develop a performance framework, independent of the Asset Confiscation 
Scheme, to enable Office of Public Prosecutions' management to assess the 
performance of the Proceeds of Crime directorate 
7. implement quality assurance processes around data and databases. 
The Department of Justice should:  
8. improve the current performance framework of the Asset Confiscation Operations 
unit to better enable the Department of Justice’s management to assess its 
performance. 
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3  Scheme governance 
At a glance 
Background  
Good governance provides the foundation for effective performance. Governance 
arrangements should be clear and understood, particularly where multiple agencies 
are involved. It should also include effective planning. 
Conclusion 
Governance issues undermine the Asset Confiscation Scheme (the Scheme). Key 
oversight committees have failed to strategically guide the Scheme as required, and a 
lack of clear leadership, oversight and accountability exacerbates these weaknesses. 
Findings  
• Three reviews over five years have highlighted governance weaknesses across 
the Scheme, most of which have not been addressed. 
• Ongoing weaknesses relate to unclear Scheme objectives, poorly functioning 
oversight committees, a lack of strategic planning, unclear leadership and 
accountability and a lack of effective coordination. 
• Governance weaknesses have diminished the capability of Victoria Police's 
Criminal Proceeds Squad, which is significant given its key role in generating the 
Scheme's activities. 
Recommendations 
• The Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group (ACSEMG) 
should clarify and confirm the objectives of the Scheme, and the Scheme's 
governance arrangements including leadership, accountability, roles and 
responsibilities and issue resolution mechanisms. 
• ACSEMG should develop strategic and operational plans for the Scheme, linked 
to Scheme agency planning. 
• Victoria Police and the Office of Public Prosecutions should develop strategic and 
operational plans, linked to those of the Scheme and other Scheme agencies. 
• Victoria Police should undertake a risk assessment of the Criminal Proceeds 
Squad and its operating environment. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Effective governance provides the foundation for effective performance. Governance 
arrangements should be clear and understood, particularly where multiple agencies 
are involved. This minimises the risk of overlap and duplication of effort, and also helps 
to allocate accountability for the success or failure of initiatives. 
Sound planning is also a key part of effective governance and management. It enables 
agencies and their business units to define objectives and how these will be achieved. 
It also assists agencies to understand and manage their resourcing requirements to 
enable them to perform their core functions. 
3.2 Conclusion 
Governance issues significantly undermine the Asset Confiscation Scheme (the 
Scheme). Key oversight committees have not met for extended periods of time and 
have failed to provide strategic guidance for the Scheme as required. The Scheme's 
governance is further weakened by a lack of clear leadership, accountability and 
coordination, a failure to plan at the Scheme level, and a failure to plan within two of 
the Scheme's agencies. 
3.3 Asset Confiscation Scheme governance 
While the Scheme has been operating for over ten years, it continues to experience 
governance problems that undermine its effectiveness and efficiency. These 
governance issues have been known since at least 2003 and were identified in the 
2008 and 2009 reviews, and in the 2012 evaluation. While efforts have been made to 
address them, these have not been effective. 
3.3.1 Objective of the Asset Confiscation Scheme 
The objective of the Scheme is unclear, with multiple documents referencing different 
objectives, and a lack of documented evidence to explain why objectives were or were 
not adopted. 
The current terms of reference for the Scheme's two oversight committees is 
‘to combat serious and organised crime through the removal of assets used in 
conjunction with the commission of an offence, derived from the commission of an 
offence, or proceeds reasonably suspected of being derived from criminal activity’. 
However, the 2012 evaluation of the Scheme identifies the Scheme's objectives as 
those of the Confiscation Act 1997 (the Act) which are: 
• depriving persons of the proceeds of certain offences and of tainted property 
• deterring persons from engaging in criminal activity 
• disrupting criminal activity by preventing the use of tainted property in further 
criminal activity. 
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There is no documentation, including meeting minutes for the oversight committees, 
that provides evidence of a decision for the Scheme’s objectives to be changed to 
reflect the Act’s objectives. 
A draft set of objectives for the Scheme was developed and approved by the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group (ACSEMG) in 2006. These draft 
objectives were to: 
• contribute to disabling and disrupting financially-motivated, organised or serious 
crime 
• remove incentives and provide deterrence for crime 
• maximise opportunities for restitution and compensation to victims of crime from 
offender’s assets 
• optimise the management of the Scheme. 
It is unclear why, despite being approved, these objectives were not adopted and did 
not drive the activities of the Scheme. 
Adding to the confusion, the 2009 review recommended to ACSEMG that the following, 
similar Scheme objectives be approved:  
• remove incentives and provide deterrence from crime 
• maximise opportunity for restitution and compensation from offenders' assets 
• optimise management of the Scheme. 
It was expected that final approval and documentation of these objectives would occur 
at the next meeting of the ACSEMG, which was scheduled for late 2009. However, 
these objectives were not included on meeting agendas until March 2010, with minutes 
showing no discussion on the objectives and no decision to adopt them. There is no 
record of why this did not occur despite the clear intent. 
3.3.2 Coordination, accountability and leadership  
Cooperative or joined-up governance structures 
The Scheme’s current governance structure is essentially a joined up activity. This 
typically involves cross-agency coordination with input from more than one agency to 
address complex, high-priority issues.  
The success of joined up initiatives depends on how well they have been designed, 
and whether the associated funding, administrative and governance arrangements 
match the scale, nature and complexity of the issue to be addressed. Figure 3A shows 
elements of joined up initiatives.  
Asset confiscation is a complex program area. Given the type and number of agencies, 
the identified weaknesses with its operation, the nature of the activity, and the linear 
and reliant processes involved, it should be a heavily joined up Scheme. Reflecting 
this, previous reviews have recommended a single entity, or at the least, collocation of 
the entities.  
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However, the Scheme is not adequately joined up as there has been a lack of 
coordination due to weaknesses with the oversight committees. While routine informal 
contact occurs, there has, until very recently, been only infrequent formal contact 
between the Scheme agencies. In addition, there are weak governance arrangements, 
including the lack of Scheme planning, the absence of joint datasets, and the absence 
of any robust assessment of risks affecting the Scheme. 
   Figure 3A
Elements of joined-up initiatives 
Element Lightly joined up Heavily joined up 
Coordination Departments share 
information about their own 
initiatives. Coordination is 
focused on program 
implementation. 
Agencies collaborate at all stages of the 
program from inception through to 
development, implementation, evaluation, 
and particularly at the point of program 
and intervention design. 
Level and 
frequency of 
contact 
Coordination-related contact 
between the departments is 
mainly at senior levels and is 
infrequent. 
Collaboration occurs at all levels of all the 
departments and is frequent. 
Strength of 
associated 
governance 
arrangements 
Light governance framework 
(‘authorising environment’). 
Supported by a secretariat 
with no directive powers. 
Governance structure specifies roles and 
responsibilities. Strategic and 
implementation plans outline priorities 
and strategies. Administrative structures 
have decision-making and directive role 
to coordinate and implement plans. 
Timeline Time frame is short term, 
with a focus on quick results. 
Time frame is long term, with a focus on 
both quick wins and wins over time. 
Data Agencies maintain their own 
datasets. 
Agencies have joint datasets and jointly 
identify data collection needs. 
Funding Agencies and individual 
programs have their own 
funding streams. 
Agencies have access to joint funding 
streams. 
Risks Risks in joining up are not 
considered. 
Risks in joining up are considered and 
managed. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office report on Coordinating Services and Initiatives for 
Aboriginal People, 2008. 
Weaknesses around coordination, accountability and leadership identified in the three 
reviews undertaken since 2008 include:  
• the Scheme has no single person with sufficient authority and oversight to make 
decisions necessary for the Scheme's success 
• the Scheme lacks clearly defined roles and accountabilities, which would 
establish the basis for approval, decision-making and provide a single source of 
direction for staff 
• the Scheme's key decision making forum, ACSEMG, has a membership that 
appears too large  
• the Scheme's Confiscation Operations Committee appears to be well integrated 
and focused but does not have integrated and focused governance structures 
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• the Scheme appears to lack agreed processes and documentation to manage 
and resolve issues that arise, to record and communicate risks identified, and to 
communicate between stakeholders 
• attendance at ACSEMG meetings is often delegated to less senior staff who do 
not have authority to make decisions. 
Apart from a review of the terms of reference, no effective action has been taken or 
committed to address these issues, and consequently many have persisted 
unnecessarily. 
Oversight committees 
The lack of effective coordination and leadership of the Scheme was a key finding of 
VAGO’s May 2003 Report on Public Sector Agencies. The report noted that the 
Scheme’s ‘governance framework would be strengthened if there was a clearer 
allocation of responsibility for strategic oversight of the scheme and provision of 
high-level advice to the government. As one option, a small executive body comprising 
the heads of each participating agency could fill this governance gap’. 
In response, a new oversight body—ACSEMG—was established to complement the 
existing Confiscation Operations Committee. ACSEMG has a broad remit, including 
responsibility: 
• for the overall performance of the Scheme in meeting its objectives 
• to act collegiately and collaboratively, on a fully informed basis with due diligence 
and care, and in the interests of the Scheme and the key agencies 
• for setting the strategic focus of the Scheme to ensure the objectives are being 
achieved with satisfactory outcomes 
• for receiving and endorsing performance reports prepared by the Confiscation 
Operations Committee and provide any overall Scheme performance reports 
required by government 
• for overseeing and advocating for the Scheme to be adequately resourced. 
ACSEMG has failed to fulfil its roles and in particular, has not set the strategic focus for 
the Scheme, nor ensured that objectives are being achieved with satisfactory 
outcomes. This is because it has failed to implement a performance framework to 
assess the achievement of outcomes, develop clear objectives, or prepare a strategic 
plan. These are all issues that have been known since at least 2008.  
Significantly, ACSEMG has failed in its responsibilities for the overall performance of 
the Scheme, demonstrated by the fact that persistent Scheme weaknesses have been 
known to it, and remained unaddressed for at least five years. 
The terms of reference require ACSEMG to meet a minimum of five times each year. It 
has consistently failed to do so. Before 2009 its meeting schedule was inconsistent, 
although it was more regular between 2009 and October 2010. During this time it did 
not, however, meet its requirement of five meetings each year.  
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Inexplicably, between October 2010 and October 2012 ACSEMG did not meet at all. 
This was not planned and there is no documented or reasonable explanation for the 
interval. The Confiscation Operations Committee, which is concerned with the 
operational, practical and administrative aspects of the Scheme, did not meet for the 
same two-year period. The obvious impact of not meeting over this time frame is two 
years of missed opportunities to address the Scheme’s weaknesses. 
ACSEMG and the Confiscation Operations Committee reconvened in November 
2012 and have met regularly since then. In addition, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
is reviewing the terms of reference for both oversight committees to provide greater 
clarity around their roles. 
Leadership and accountability 
While DOJ is ultimately accountable for the Scheme, and performs a leadership role, 
the nature of the governance arrangements means that accountability and leadership 
are only notional.  
In practice, the Scheme includes two statutorily independent bodies (Victoria Police 
and the Office of Public Prosecutions), over which DOJ has no control. This is not an 
ideal arrangement, and undermines the Scheme's governance. This means the 
Scheme heavily relies on each stakeholder to be as efficient and effective as possible. 
Additionally, if one stakeholder is not performing, DOJ has no practical way to 
influence improvement. This has the potential to affect the whole Scheme. 
These weaknesses mean that the Scheme relies on effective cooperation to succeed. 
While there are elements of cooperation, the formal cooperative arrangements have 
not been effective. This is evidenced by the consistent findings in the Scheme reviews 
around governance, and the routine breakdown in the functioning of the oversight 
committees.  
Governance structures 
Victoria’s governance arrangements are broadly consistent with other Australian 
approaches to asset confiscation. Recognising the limitations of the current 
arrangements, alternative organisational structures to address governance 
weaknesses have been recommended to the government, and pursued by the 
government, at different times over the past five years. 
In August 2010, the government requested DOJ to further develop the option of an 
integrated agency to focus on criminal and civil forfeiture and report back in February 
2011. This timing coincided with the state election and subsequent change of 
government in November 2010.  
In January 2011, the Attorney-General, in response to advice on continuing with the 
reform work for a single entity, noted that a change of direction was likely, but that it 
was not possible to make a decision on the options as proposed.  
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Consequently, work to further develop the single entity has not progressed and the 
status quo governance arrangements remain, and their weaknesses persist. As there 
is no clear plan to address these issues, it is likely that the Scheme will remain limited 
in its effectiveness and efficiency. 
3.4 Planning and resources 
Sound planning is a key part of effective governance and management. It enables 
agencies and its business units to define objectives and how these will be achieved. 
Typically, planning involves routine environmental scanning of the operating 
environment to understand risks and opportunities, to identify strategic issues and 
gaps, and to identify service demands. Sound planning also involves identifying the 
tools, actions and resources needed to achieve the stated objectives, maximise 
opportunities, address issues and gaps, manage demand and mitigate risks. 
There is a great necessity for sound planning for the Scheme, given the number of 
agencies involved, their differing roles and the need for integrated planning with 
partner agencies. 
Effective planning for asset confiscation does not occur at the Scheme level, and 
varies across the three agencies. The absence of effective planning is most notable at 
Victoria Police, which is essentially the driver of Scheme activity. This undermines the 
Scheme’s ability to achieve its objectives. 
3.4.1 Scheme planning 
Despite reviews since 2008 identifying the need to improve the Scheme’s strategic 
planning, no effective planning has been undertaken. There is no plan that brings 
together information about the Scheme’s opportunities and risks that clarifies the 
objectives and outcomes, how performance will be assessed, or its direction or 
priorities.  
ACSEMG is responsible for establishing such a plan, and the absence of a plan 
represents another failing of this important oversight and coordinating body. In the 
absence of a Scheme-based plan, Scheme planning relies on the planning activities of 
the individual agencies. This either occurs in a limited way, or not all, and not in a way 
that considers the role of each Scheme agency and maximises integration. 
3.4.2 Agency planning 
Criminal Proceeds Squad 
Victoria Police, and more specifically the Criminal Proceeds Squad (CPS), perform a 
significant role within the Scheme. Victoria Police is responsible for identifying assets 
for confiscation, primarily through investigations, and subsequently generating work for 
both the Office of Public Prosecutions' Proceeds of Crime directorate (POC) and DOJ's 
Asset Confiscation Operations (ACO)—both of which perform reactive roles.  
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The overall success of the Scheme is heavily dependent on how effectively Victoria 
Police and CPS plans and performs. Given Victoria Police’s role in the Scheme, and in 
asset confiscation more generally, there is a greater need for it to plan effectively. 
Regular turnover of CPS staff—particularly its management—makes strategic and 
business planning more critical.  
CPS does not effectively plan as part of its activities. It does not have any strategic or 
business plans, and other than at a high level, what it is tasked with doing is unclearly 
documented. It is not clear that CPS has undertaken or documented any assessments 
of the proceeds of the crime-operating environment, including where there are 
opportunities, priorities, gaps or challenges. 
Victoria Police advised that operational and strategic plans for CPS are best developed 
under the Scheme's own governance and performance management arrangements. 
While planning at the Scheme level is required, this does not remove the need for 
planning by CPS. It is inappropriate for the Scheme to perform this planning on behalf 
of CPS—not least because CPS does not exclusively service the Scheme. It needs to 
undertake its own planning, that links to the planning of the Scheme.  
The main consequence of the lack of planning is that it is unclear precisely what role 
CPS has in relation to criminal proceeds. New staff have no coherent guidance about 
CPS and its activities and functions. The lack of CPS planning also limits the ability of 
other Scheme agencies to plan given they have little understanding about CPS 
priorities. In addition, it means that neither CPS nor anyone else is able to assess the 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy of CPS because they have nothing against 
which to assess its performance. 
The only planning-related document available is a draft 2013 action plan that CPS has 
developed to guide it. There are no action plans for previous years, and while still draft, 
there is no apparent mechanism to monitor progress. The action plan details 
20 actions, although it is unclear how these actions were identified, how they fit into the 
'bigger picture' for proceeds of crime within Victoria Police, or how they complement 
anything done as part of the Scheme.  
The actions have been categorised against time frames that are either short term, 
medium term or long term. It is unclear what these terms mean, which in addition to 
there being no monitoring, makes it difficult to assess progress. Critically, there is no 
information about the resources required (financial and human) to implement these 
actions, or how the actions will be implemented. Each action needs a detailed plan 
underpinning it, which does not exist. 
Further undermining CPS's ability to plan is its inability to obtain data to support 
planning around the proceeds of crime-operating environment. While assertions have 
been made that cases are more complex and are taking longer, there is no supporting 
evidence.  
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Proceeds of Crime directorate 
POC’s role in relation to asset confiscation is necessarily a reactive one, based on the 
assets that Victoria Police identifies for confiscation, and the number of supporting 
affidavits it sends to POC. Given this, its planning is partly reliant on there being 
effective planning at CPS. This would enable it to understand the priorities, and the 
active and planned investigations across Victoria Police, and plan strategically and 
operationally around these. 
Regardless of the lack of planning at CPS, POC does not have effective planning 
systems and processes in place. It has no strategic or business plans that detail the 
broader and longer-term issues impacting on its role, the external workload pressures, 
what it aims to achieve each year, its priorities and its resource needs.  
POC has articulated five goals in its practice manual. While these are intended to 
provide direction, in the absence of a plan it is unclear how POC intends to achieve 
these goals, or how it will assess achievement of the goals.  
Asset Confiscation Operations 
Like POC, ACO’s role is a reactive one as it responds to the orders that POC obtains 
in court. This presents the same challenges in terms of effective planning if the other 
stakeholders in the process are not planning. However, unlike either CPS or POC, 
DOJ and ACO have comprehensive planning around the Scheme and asset 
management and disposal activities—with some weaknesses. 
Planning occurs within Infringement Management and Business Services, which is the 
business unit overseeing ACO. This planning includes both a strategic plan and a 
business plan. In the strategic plan, the focus is on the Scheme itself—reviewing the 
Scheme—rather than ACO. However, as DOJ is accountable for the Scheme, this 
focus on reviewing the Scheme is appropriate. 
The business plan identifies priorities and actions related to ACO. However, there is 
not always a clear alignment between the priorities and actions. While one priority is to 
‘make it as easy as possible to address infringements and confiscation orders’, there is 
no action to address this.  
In addition, for two priorities where actions have been identified, there is either no 
evidence that the actions have been completed, or they have not been completed. One 
action was for ACO to engage with the main Scheme agencies by December 2011. 
While ACO state this occurred, when it occurred and the nature of the engagement 
cannot be substantiated through other forms of evidence. That ACSEMG did not meet 
during this time indicates that the engagement did not occur through this forum. 
The Infringement Management and Business Services business plan also included 
actions for ACO, to analyse the impacts of legislative changes, and to analyse 
procedural and system changes. There is no evidence that these have occurred. This 
lack of action highlights a potential weakness in the monitoring and reporting of 
progress against actions, particularly given that implementation plans have been 
developed for each action. 
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3.4.3 Scheme and agency resources 
Having sufficient and appropriate resources is essential if the Scheme is to achieve its 
objectives. The Scheme itself does not have specific resources so individual agencies 
are responsible for determining whether they have the resources they need. Requests 
as part of the annual state budget process are, however, coordinated through DOJ. 
Criminal Proceeds Squad 
Victoria Police assesses its resourcing needs through annual workgroup reviews. 
These reviews provide an opportunity for managers to raise resourcing issues with 
senior management. At the workgroup review conducted in March 2013, a range of 
issues were identified relating to CPS resourcing, particularly around the staff 
numbers, capability and capacity, oversight and the nature of the work. In part to 
address these issues, CPS requested a further nine operational staff. Through the 
annual budget process, CPS also requested funding for two forensic accountants. 
While CPS was successful in obtaining funding for the forensic accountants, these 
requests have occurred without any demonstrated need, without effective operational 
and strategic planning, and without any demonstrated assessment of improved 
outcomes. CPS's inability to collate, analyse and report on management information 
has diminished its ability to demonstrate these things. 
Additional resources are unlikely to make much difference to CPS without first 
addressing the major structural, operational and administrative issues affecting CPS. 
Significant effort should be directed to maximising the efficiencies and effectiveness of 
CPS and its systems, processes and current resources, including developing sound 
plans to underpin the assessment of resource requirements. 
The ability of CPS to effectively and efficiently perform its role has also been hindered 
by the way it has structured its resources. Operational staff are allocated across seven 
teams. While these staff are all considered part of CPS, in reality four teams are either 
embedded in, or seconded to, Victoria Police taskforces. The activity of these teams is 
counted in CPS statistics, although in practice they have little, if any direct connection 
with CPS, and the Officer in Charge of CPS has limited oversight of these staff.  
This arrangement has reduced CPS's ability to undertake more targeted investigations. 
Recognising this, CPS has started to recall staff embedded from the taskforces to 
improve its capability and capacity.  
Given the routine nature of much of CPS’s work, Victoria Police should consider 
whether the current model of resourcing CPS is the most economical. Many CPS 
functions could be performed by unsworn staff at a significantly lower cost, while also 
freeing up sworn staff for other Victoria Police priorities. However, it is recognised that 
such a model may be inconsistent with its commitment to reduce the number of 
unsworn staff. 
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Proceeds of Crime directorate and Asset Confiscation Operations 
Both POC and ACO have sufficient and appropriate resources to perform its functions.  
Following the May 2013 budget, POC received funding for an additional eight solicitors 
and one legal administrative assistant. This will bring POC’s resources to 22 staff, 
which it considers sufficient to address demand from Victoria Police. POC also has 
access to two forensic accountants on secondment from ACO. 
Previously, nine of POC’s legal staff were funded through supplementary funding, 
which lapsed every four years. The new funding is ongoing, and should eliminate the 
uncertainty around these positions. 
Similarly, while ACO did not receive any additional resources in the May 2013 budget, 
it considers its resources to be adequate to perform its functions. 
3.5 Risk management 
Effective risk management is fundamental to public sector operations, as well as 
effective governance and planning. It enables entities and agencies to identify and 
manage risks and opportunities that may arise while performing their functions. 
Risk management across the Scheme and Victoria Police is inadequate to properly 
manage known risks. Risk management practices within both POC and ACO are more 
advanced. 
3.5.1 Asset Confiscation Scheme 
When departments work across their traditional boundaries in a joined-up way, it is 
important that the particular risks and opportunities inherent in this arrangement are 
identified and managed, because the actions of individual departments are likely to 
affect the activities of others. From a joined-up perspective, common risks include: 
• parties working towards different goals, with outcomes not being achieved if 
goals for the initiative are not shared or clearly defined 
• objectives not being met if sufficient and appropriate resources are not available, 
including skilled people 
• initiatives failing and not meeting their objectives when leadership is unclear 
• difficulties in attributing accountability for success or failure if roles and 
responsibilities are unclear. 
No adequate assessment of risks for the Scheme has been undertaken. The 
2012 evaluation identified five risks for the Scheme. However, no ratings were applied 
to the risks and no mitigation strategies were identified. Of note, there were no risks 
identified in relation to the governance of the Scheme, which has been shown to be 
one of the more significant limiting factors. Not recognising these risks or developing 
actions to address them has likely contributed to the lack of action to improve the 
Scheme. 
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3.5.2 Victoria Police and the Criminal Proceeds Squad 
Risk management around asset confiscation occurs at the Crime Command (formerly 
the Crime Department) level. It has identified one risk relating to Victoria Police's ability 
to adequately identify and restrain assets. This is rated as extreme, given Victoria 
Police’s view that the likelihood of this not occurring adequately is almost certain and 
the consequence is major. It has also rated the existing controls as poor. While 
mitigation strategies have been developed, these are limited and unlikely to address 
the breadth and significance of the issues affecting CPS. 
There is no risk management plan within CPS, even though a range of problems with 
the squad are well known to CPS management. This reflects a further weakness in the 
planning process and CPS would benefit from developing a squad-specific risk 
assessment to better identify and manage its operational and strategic risks. 
Victoria Police advised that, like its operational and strategic planning, risk 
management for CPS would best be developed under the Scheme's own governance 
and performance management arrangements. Again, it is inappropriate for the Scheme 
to perform this on behalf of Victoria Police. 
3.5.3 Proceeds of Crime directorate and Asset 
Confiscation Operations 
Both POC and ACO have developed risk management frameworks that identify risks 
pertinent to the functions they perform. For POC, risks are operational. There is no 
assessment of strategic risks, with the notable absence being the historical reliance on 
supplementary funding and the subsequent risks this presented to performing its 
functions.  
However, given the well documented weaknesses with the Scheme, and well-known 
weaknesses among the Scheme stakeholders with respect to certain elements of the 
asset confiscation process, it is notable that the risk frameworks for both agencies do 
not address these issues more broadly. Both agencies should review their risk 
frameworks in light of this. 
Both agencies have also developed adequate mitigation strategies, with ACO 
reviewing its risks quarterly thereby enabling it to remain assured that its mitigation 
strategies are still relevant and appropriate. 
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Recommendations 
The Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive Management Group should: 
9. clarify and confirm the objectives of the Asset Confiscation Scheme 
10. update the terms of reference for the Asset Confiscation Scheme Executive 
Management Group and Confiscation Operations Committee, and schedule 
routine reviews so that they remain current 
11. clarify and confirm the Asset Confiscation Scheme governance arrangements, 
including leadership, accountability, roles and responsibilities and issue resolution 
mechanisms 
12. undertake a risk assessment for the Asset Confiscation Scheme, including the 
risks associated with working in a joined-up arrangement 
13. develop strategic and operational plans for the Asset Confiscation Scheme, 
linked to Asset Confiscation Scheme agency planning. 
Victoria Police should: 
14. develop strategic and operational plans, linked to those of Crime Command, the 
Asset Confiscation Scheme and other Asset Confiscation Scheme agencies 
15. undertake a risk assessment of the Criminal Proceeds Squad and its operating 
environment 
16. review the resourcing model for the Criminal Proceeds Squad, including the 
cost-effectiveness of using Victorian Public Service staff. 
The Office of Public Prosecutions should: 
17. develop strategic and operational plans, linked to those of the Asset Confiscation 
Scheme and other Asset Confiscation Scheme agencies. 
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4  Scheme operation 
At a glance 
Background  
There are three key agencies working together to achieve the objectives of the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme—Victoria Police, responsible for identifying assets, the Office of 
Public Prosecutions (OPP), responsible for restraining assets, and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), which manages and disposes of assets. 
Conclusion 
While Victoria Police is the driver of asset confiscation, its ability to perform this role is 
undermined by capacity and capability weaknesses. Ultimately, Victoria Police is not 
maximising opportunities to identify assets for confiscation. The other agencies 
necessarily react to the work generated by Victoria Police. While opportunities exist to 
enhance their operations, both OPP and DOJ are generally performing their core asset 
confiscation functions effectively and efficiently. 
Findings  
• The majority of the Criminal Proceeds Squad’s (CPS) asset confiscation work 
relates to victims of crimes, rather than profit-motivated, serious and organised 
crime. 
• CPS does not effectively prioritise its asset confiscation work, or use investigative 
tools in a way that maximises the identification of assets. 
• CPS's staff training is informal, inconsistent and ad hoc, reducing its capability. 
• OPP effectively and efficiently restrains assets through the courts. 
• The Asset Confiscation Operations unit effectively, efficiently and economically 
manages and disposes of restrained and forfeited assets. 
Recommendations 
Victoria Police should: 
• refocus CPS' investigations to be predominantly focused on profit-motivated 
serious and organised crime 
• redevelop practices so that investigative tools are used to their full potential 
• develop and implement a CPS training strategy that includes consistent 
compulsory induction for new staff members. 
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4.1 Introduction 
There are three key agencies working together to achieve the objectives of the Asset 
Confiscation Scheme (the Scheme)—Victoria Police, responsible for identifying assets, 
the Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP), responsible for restraining assets and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), which manages and disposes of assets. 
For the Scheme to achieve its objectives, each of these agencies needs to perform its 
functions effectively and efficiently. This is particularly important for Victoria Police, 
which drives the Scheme through its key role of identifying assets for confiscation. 
4.2 Conclusion 
Victoria Police is the driver of asset confiscation, but it is unable to effectively and 
efficiently perform this role. The Criminal Proceeds Squad’s (CPS) performance is 
undermined by operational deficiencies and a focus on victims of crime work that does 
not directly or demonstrably contribute to the Scheme’s objectives to deter, disrupt and 
deprive criminal activity. Ultimately, Victoria Police is not maximising opportunities to 
identify assets for confiscation related to serious, profit-motivated crime. 
The other agencies—OPP's Proceeds of Crime directorate (POC) and DOJ's Asset 
Confiscation Operations unit (ACO)—necessarily react to the work that Victoria Police 
generates. While opportunities exist to enhance their operations, both agencies are 
generally performing their core asset confiscation functions effectively and efficiently.  
4.3 Identifying assets for restraint 
Victoria Police, and more specifically CPS, is responsible for identifying assets for 
restraint. The existence of a dedicated squad is a positive development towards 
achieving the Scheme’s objectives, and it is evident that CPS is performing asset 
confiscation work.  
Issues relating to the type of investigations CPS undertakes, how it undertakes them, 
and administrative weaknesses around the prioritisation and allocation of cases, mean 
it is not operating as effectively or efficiently as it should.  
4.3.1 Investigations 
The Scheme's focus is on serious and organised crime. Similarly, CPS considers that 
its focus is on the ‘upper echelons of organised crime’. However, in practice, up to 
60 per cent of CPS's work relates to victims of crime.  
Victims of crime investigations involve CPS identifying the restrainable assets of an 
offender that the courts have charged, are about to charge, or have been found guilty 
or convicted of an offence. These investigations are undertaken on behalf of the victim, 
and typically POC also acts to restrain these assets in court, also on behalf of the 
victim. In most cases, it is up to the victim to seek restitution or compensation and 
enforce the courts' orders. 
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Analysis of CPS data, excluding taskforces, between 2009 and March 2013 identifies 
that of a total of 515 cases, 62 per cent were victims’ compensation cases and 
38 per cent were forfeiture cases. Figure 4A shows the proportion of victims of crime 
work by pending, allocated and finalised cases.  
  Figure 4A
Percentage of CPS victims of crime work, 2009 to March 2013 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from Victoria Police data. 
While victims’ compensation is a purpose of the Confiscation Act 1997, it is unclear 
why CPS is performing this function, at least to the current extent. CPS performs the 
key role of identifying assets on behalf of victims. This work is time intensive and 
anecdotally results in few victims pursuing the offender in court. The focus on this type 
of work detracts from what should be its focus on profit-motivated, serious and 
organised crime, which is the Scheme's focus. 
Consideration needs to be given to whether CPS remains the responsible agency for 
performing this work—particularly if the Scheme’s objectives, with a focus on 
profit-motivated, serious and organised crime, are to be given every chance of being 
achieved. Victoria Police advised that while it intends to decentralise victims' 
compensation work within Victoria Police in the short term, it sees an opportunity for 
government to improve services to victims in the longer term by developing a facility 
external to Victoria Police to manage and perform this important service. 
Investigative tools 
CPS has adequate investigative tools and sources of information available to it to 
identify assets for confiscation. Common examples of information sources include 
financial institutions and taxation information. The Victoria Police section 139A reports, 
and a review of CPS activities identifies that these information sources are routinely 
accessed.  
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However, CPS is not making full use of its investigative tools, and may therefore be 
missing important assets. Through this audit, Victoria Police has been made aware of 
this weakness. Specific details have been excluded from this report due to operational 
sensitivities. 
Investigation training and guidance 
While CPS staff are typically experienced investigators, proceeds of crime 
investigations requires specialist knowledge around the investigation process and the 
law relating to asset confiscation. With regular turnover of staff within CPS, effective 
training is particularly important for new squad members. 
There is inconsistent training on asset confiscation within CPS. There is no formal 
training program, and while an induction package exists, this was developed by one 
staff member and used primarily for new staff allocated to that team. There is no 
process to enable the sharing of this information, and no requirement that it is used 
consistently across CPS.  
This ad hoc approach to training and induction means that new staff can experience 
training that ranges from reactive guidance and on-job training, through to a 
comprehensive overview and detailed guidance. This approach has obvious capability 
risks for CPS. 
Criminal proceeds investigation guidelines are used by most CPS staff as a reference 
and to complement any training they receive. While the guidelines are a positive 
initiative, there are a range of weaknesses with them that undermine the effort to 
investigate criminal proceeds matters.  
The guidelines are not routinely reviewed and updated, despite requiring annual review 
and update. While they have recently been reviewed and approved, this is the first 
review since their creation. Given regular changes to case law around asset 
confiscation, irregular updates create risks that investigators are not fully aware of the 
current law.  
There is inadequate information about the roles and responsibilities of CPS team 
members, including responsibility for quality control such as checking affidavits before 
sending them to OPP, and monitoring the progress of cases.  
Significantly, there is no clear and consistent guidance on the overall value of assets 
worth restraining. CPS staff use the guidelines, seek advice from POC and also have 
their own views on what is a reasonable value. Through this audit, Victoria Police has 
been made aware of this weakness. Specific details have been excluded from this 
report due to operational sensitivities. 
4.3.2 Prioritising investigations 
In receiving referrals, CPS is required to follow Victoria Police’s accountability and 
resource model. This model dictates who is responsible for investigating certain 
categories of crime. In essence, more significant crime is investigated by specialist 
squads, such as CPS, while less significant crimes are investigated by regional staff. 
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Rather than use the established prioritisation model, CPS has developed its own 
response criteria that are designed to guide CPS on how it prioritises the cases that 
come in from across Victoria Police and from victims of crime. The criteria are 
high-level statements on the kinds of activities CPS performs. However, the statements 
do not provide any criteria for prioritising cases. Consequently, while a Category One 
matter should have priority, a Category Two matter may take priority if it has more to 
offer in terms of proceeds for restraint and forfeiture. Consequently, there is nothing to 
guide consistent or predictable decision-making. 
Furthermore, even the response criteria are not consistently used, with CPS staff 
advising that prioritising and allocating cases within CPS adopts a ‘common sense’ 
approach that incorporates six undocumented ‘principles’. 
  Figure 4B
Prioritisation and allocation principles 
Principle Details 
The age of the offences  There is less likelihood in receiving a 
compensation pay-out on an older crime 
The age of the victim  Action would be taken sooner if a child was 
the victim 
Whether the offender is in a position to make 
restitution 
If an offender has no assets, there is no 
point in taking action 
What impact the crime has had on a victim Fraud of a small business can cripple it, 
where as a bank will continue to function 
Whether the victim will file for a 
compensation order once the assets have 
been seized 
Assessed by whether the victim has legal 
representation 
The risk that the assets/cash will dissipate  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from Victoria Police data.  
These 'common sense’ principles used in assessing cases are weighted towards 
victims of crime cases, with a lack of focus on automatic and civil forfeiture cases, as 
this reflects a majority of the cases received by CPS.  
If these principles are followed as documented above, then there is a risk that 
prioritisation will not be undertaken appropriately and action to investigate will not start 
in a timely way. The consequence is that assets may dissipate before action can be 
taken, reducing the likelihood of the Scheme's objectives being met. 
Subsequent advice from CPS on prioritisation indicates that other criteria determine 
how CPS prioritises. It has advised that ‘each case is determined on its merits with 
regard to the likelihood of a successful prosecution and the potential application of the 
Confiscation Act 1997’. These further criteria demonstrate confusion around the 
prioritisation process, and exacerbate the risks of dissipation.  
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Allocation 
Acting quickly to restrain assets automatically forfeited is essential to avoid the assets 
being dissipated. Victoria Police advised that automatic forfeiture cases ‘nearly always’ 
have priority over victims’ compensation cases. Based on Victoria Police's prioritisation 
model, forfeiture cases should always take priority over victims’ cases. Weaknesses in 
the way CPS record their data means it is not possible to get accurate information for 
all cases. However, it is evident that forfeiture cases are not always prioritised. Nor is 
there prompt action to allocate cases, despite the time criticality of restraining assets to 
minimise the risk of asset dissipation. Of the 515 cases pending, allocated and 
finalised between 2009 and March 2013: 
• there were 46 victims cases and eight forfeiture cases pending allocation  
• of the eight forfeiture cases, three had no date of receipt, meaning it is not 
possible to determine how long they have been pending—one case had been 
pending for at least 27 weeks 
• there were two examples of victims’ cases allocated before pending forfeiture 
case. 
CPS needs to take action to address these weaknesses by developing and enforcing 
the consistent use of case prioritisation and allocation techniques. This should include 
improvements to the way that it records this information in its systems. 
4.4 Restraining, managing and disposing of assets 
Restraining property, through the use of restraining orders, is an important stage in the 
asset confiscation process. Its purpose is to prevent the disposal of property so that it 
will be available for a potential forfeiture order, an automatic forfeiture, a pecuniary 
penalty order, or for restitution or compensation.  
Broadly, this process involves POC applying for restraining orders in the County and 
Supreme Courts, and ACO identifying the assets in the restraining order. Delays in 
obtaining restraining orders and securing assets increases the risk that the assets will 
be dissipated. 
While these agencies' functions are necessarily reactive—POC reacting to the 
outcome of CPS investigations, and ACO reacting to the outcome of the restraining 
order application process—both are performing this part of their roles effectively and 
efficiently. 
4.4.1 Restraining assets 
POC is performing its core role, which is to obtain restraining orders. It is evident, 
through documentation, file review and observation, that it is performing functions 
including finalising the development of affidavits, attending court to obtain restraining 
orders, and participating in exclusion application processes. 
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The data POC keeps to record the timeliness of its processes and the outcomes of 
restraining order applications contains weaknesses. This includes missing fields for 
earlier years and a small number of duplicate entries and errors. However, it is still 
possible to ascertain that restraining orders are dealt with efficiently, particularly from a 
timeliness perspective, and are effective in terms of the very high rate of successful 
applications. This was also the case for its role in providing restraining orders to both 
ACO and CPS. 
POC's activities are supported by comprehensive policies and procedures. 
4.4.2 Managing and disposing of assets 
The final stage in asset confiscation process is managing and disposing of restrained 
and forfeited assets. This is the role of ACO. 
ACO has policies and procedures in place to guide its activities around asset 
management and disposal. However, there are a range of weaknesses with the 
policies and procedures that, while not material, have the potential to lead to 
inconsistent approaches to managing and disposing of restrained and forfeited assets. 
These weaknesses include incomplete sections of the procedures and unclear 
guidance around seeking advice and competitive procurement processes.  
At the present time, the procedures are understood and used by staff in ACO. This is 
because ACO's staff base has been stable over a number of years. However, ACO 
should properly document its processes and procedures to ensure they better describe 
the work undertaken. This is particularly important to ensure that effective and efficient 
processes currently in place are not lost, should staff leave ACO. ACO has advised 
that it has recently reviewed the manual, and will consolidate three chapters dealing 
with similar issues. It has also started work to complete the remainder of the manual.  
Managing, maintaining and disposing of property 
ACO’s practices and controls around the management, maintenance and disposal of 
forfeited assets are generally effective and economical. Efficiency, in terms of 
timeliness for real property, is discussed in Part 2. 
Real property 
Real property is the most complex asset that ACO disposes of because a range of 
scenarios can arise during the disposal process. ACO cannot access this property 
before it registers the Attorney General's interest on the property title. Until this time, 
ACO can only view the property from the street.  
For real property, such as land and houses, adequate processes exist to maximise the 
return to the state and minimise management costs. Independent valuations are 
sought from the Valuer-General, with the assessed market value set as the reserve 
price. Having the properties independently valued ensures that the process of setting a 
reserve price for auction is transparent. ACO will not sell a property that does not meet 
the reserve price. 
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ACO has sound processes that enable it to assess what work it needs to do before it 
can sell the property. It undertakes only essential work so that the property is safe and 
presentable for sale. Additionally, ACO has a range of processes in place to 
demonstrate transparent processes, minimised costs and maximised returns to the 
state. These processes include competitive procurement processes for maintenance, 
as well as engaging someone to sell the property. 
Motor vehicles and other property 
Victoria Police sells forfeited motor vehicles and other smaller property on behalf of 
ACO, governed by a memorandum of understanding. The disposal of assets is 
undertaken under contracts that Victoria Police has in place with three third party 
providers specialising in the auction of cars, jewellery and other goods.  
The memorandum of understanding specifies performance expectations, particularly in 
relation to the timely collection and disposal of assets as required by ACO. The 
performance indicators above do not specify the quality of the service offered to ACO, 
and there are no details as to what constitutes the timely collection or disposal of 
assets. However, as many of the assets are held by Victoria Police, ACO has little 
control over the collection and disposal process. 
Bank accounts, shares and cash 
ACO has sound processes for recovering money in bank accounts where the court has 
ordered forfeiture. This includes processes where the amount of recovered funds 
differs from what was expected, and processes for transferring forfeited funds into a 
trust account. 
Shares make up a very small number of the forfeited assets that ACO deals with. 
While 15 share portfolios have been forfeited since 2007–08, apart from one significant 
year, the gross value of this asset class ranges from between $0 (in two years) to  
$200 000. Processes are in place to manage this asset, although they lack clarity 
around competitive procurement—particularly for portfolios in excess of $1 million.  
Given that ACO adopts a request for quotation process for the sale of houses that do 
not exceed $1 million, and also for maintenance works that do not exceed $1 000 at 
times, the process for larger share sales should also be transparent. There is a need 
for ACO to adopt a consistent approach to the sale of various classes of assets.  
Cash is typically seized by Victoria Police at the time of arrest and kept as evidence. At 
the time of arrest, if the cash seized is included in the affidavit for restraint, this cash is 
forfeited. ACO has adequate processes to ensure that any seized cash is transferred 
to it, and subsequently transferred to ACO's trust fund. 
Scheme operation 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report  Asset Confiscation Scheme        51 
Asset Confiscation Operations trust fund 
ACO manages a trust fund which it uses to deposit monies from the disposal of 
forfeited property. The trust fund was established to provide a safeguard to mitigate 
any claims for damages that may be made against the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
for undertakings he gives to the court for assets subject to the operation of the 
restraining order. 
ACO has adequate procedures and controls in place to manage the trust fund, 
including controls for cash movements and financial transfers. Case files include 
appropriate evidence of financial transactions and provide the required assurance 
around the use of controls. 
ACO's processes and controls are linked into, and dependent on, DOJ. ACO has 
oversight of the funds it manages, but it does not have autonomous control over the 
trust fund. ACO also adheres to the financial delegations of DOJ, rather than the higher 
delegations that the ACO's assistant director has. Both these controls help to ensure 
that ACO manages the risk of fraud occurring within ACO. ACO also monitors its 
financial position through monthly reconciliations. 
Recommendations 
Victoria Police should: 
18. refocus the Criminal Proceeds Squad’s investigations to be predominantly 
focused on profit-motivated, serious and organised crime 
19. reallocate responsibility across the organisation for assisting victims of crime in 
identifying and restraining assets 
20. redevelop practices to ensure that investigative tools are used to their full 
potential 
21. develop and implement a Criminal Proceeds Squad training strategy that includes 
consistent, compulsory inductions for new staff members 
22. establish processes for routine and regular review of criminal proceeds guidance 
23. develop, document and enforce the consistent use of case prioritisation and 
allocation procedures  
24. improve the way that the Criminal Proceeds Squad records prioritisation and 
allocation information to enable better management reporting. 
The Department of Justice should: 
25. review and update the procedures for the Asset Confiscation Operations unit. 
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Appendix A. 
 Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was 
provided to the Department of Justice, the Office of Public Prosecutions and Victoria 
Police. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
 
Response provided by:  
Department of Justice ................................................................................................. 54 
Office of Public Prosecutions Victoria ......................................................................... 55 
Victoria Police .............................................................................................................. 57 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, the Department of Justice 
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RESPONSE provided by the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions, Office of Public 
Prosecutions Victoria 
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RESPONSE provided by the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions, Office of Public 
Prosecutions Victoria –continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police 
 

Auditor-General’s reports 
 
Reports tabled during 2013–14 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Operating Water Infrastructure Using Public Private Partnerships (2013–14:1) August 2013 
Developing Transport Infrastructure and Services for Population Growth Areas 
(2013–14:2) 
August 2013 
 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO. 
The full text of the reports issued is available at the website.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability of reports 
Copies of all reports issued by the Victorian Auditor-General's Office are available 
from: 
• Victorian Government Bookshop  
Level 20, 80 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic. 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: 1300 366 356 (local call cost) 
Fax: +61 3 9603 9920 
Email: bookshop@dbi.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.bookshop.vic.gov.au 
• Victorian Auditor-General's Office  
Level 24, 35 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic. 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000   
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010  
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.audit.vic.gov.au 
 
